-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 64
Initial very rough draft for early pre-ELVES soft concensus #144
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
base: main
Are you sure you want to change the base?
Conversation
I'm really not confinced by how we'dchoose this delay yet.
AlistairStewart
left a comment
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
First look.
|
|
||
| We expect this early soft concensus creates back pressure that improves performance under babe forks. | ||
|
|
||
| Alistair: TODO? |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
This proposal also halts the chain when less than 2/3 of validators are online. ELVES is not secure when this happens. Governance, even doomsday governance, is planned to be secured by ELVES so cannot help.
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Added remarks on this in 425bfee but further down. We could make that remark here, not sure.
| ### Mid-strenght concensus | ||
|
|
||
| In this RFC, we only require that each relay chain block contain preference votes for its parent from 2/3rds of validators. We could enforce the opposite direction too: Around y>2 seconds after a validator V has seen preference votes for a chain head X from 2/3rd of validators, the V begins rejecting any relay chain block that does not build upon X. This is tricky because the y>2 second delay must be long enough so that most honest nodes learn both X and its preference votes. This strengthens MEV defenses that assume some honest nodes. | ||
|
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Indeed we can use this vote in an economic finality mechanism that gives new trade-offs of latency for security. In 8-10 seconds after a block is produced, we would normally know that only disputes, which always result in large slashes could reverse it. There should be an easy migration path from this RFC to such a protocol, by putting more conditions on this vote and block production.
Rendered
Addresses relay chain equivocations in ELVES, makes nicer assignment strategies possible, and hopefuly reduces validator workloads.