MSC2278: Deleting attachments for expired and redacted messages

proposals/2278-deleting-content.md

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+# Proposal for deleting content for expired and redacted messages
+
+## Overview
+
+[MSC1763](https://https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/1763) proposes
+the `m.room.retention` state event for defining how aggressively servers
+should purge old messages for a given room.
+
+It originally also specified how media for purged events should be purged from
+disk, however this was split out into a new MSC [by
+request](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/1763#discussion_r320289119)
+during review.
+
+## Proposal
+
+We handle encrypted & unencrypted rooms differently.  Both require an API to
+delete content from the local media repo (bug
+[#790](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/issues/790)), for which we
+propose:
+
+```
+DELETE /_matrix/media/r0/download/{serverName}/{mediaId}
+{}
+```
+
+The user must be authenticated via access_token or Authorization header as the
+original uploader or as a server admin in order to delete the content.
+
+Servers may wish to quarantine the deleted content for some timeframe before
+actually purging it from storage, in order to mitigate abuse.
+
+	XXX: We might want to provide an undelete API too to let users rescue
+	their content that they accidentally deleted, as you would get on a
+	typical desktop OS file manager.  Perhaps `DELETE` with `{ undelete: true }`?
+
+	XXX: We might also want to let admins quarantine rather than delete attachments
+	without a timelimit by passing `{ quarantine: true }` or similar.
+
+Server admins may choose to mark some content as undeletable in their
+implementation (e.g. for sticker packs and other content which should never be
+deleted or quarantined.)
+
+### Encrypted rooms
+
+There is no way for server to know what events refer to which MXC URL, so we
+leave it up to the client to DELETE any MXC URLs referred to by an event after
+it expires or redacts its local copy of an event.
+
+We rely on the fact that MXC URLs should not be reused between encrypted
+events, as we expect each event to have different message keys to avoid
+correlation.  As a result, it should be safe to assume each attachment has
+only one referring event, and so when a client deems that the event should
+be deleted, it is safe to also delete the attachment without breaking any
+other events.
+
+It seems reasonable to consider the special case of forwarding encrypted
+attachments between rooms as an a 'copy by reference' - if the original
+event gets deleted, the others should too.  If this isn't desired, then
+the attachment should be reencrypted.
+
+### Unencrypted rooms
+
+It's common for MXC URLs to be shared between unencrypted events - e.g. reusing
+sticker media, or when forwarding messages between rooms, etc.  In this instance,
+the homeserver (not media server) should count the references to a given MXC URL
+by events which refer to it.
+
+If all events which refer to it have been purged or redacted, the HS should delete
+the attachment - either by internally deleting the media, or if using an
+external media repository, by calling the DELETE api upon it.
+
+If a new event is received over federation which refers to a deleted
+attachment, then the server should operate as if it has never heard of that
+attachment; pulling it in over federation from whatever the source server is.
+(This will break if the remote server sends an event referring to the local
+MXC URL, so don't do that.)
+
+In the scenario of (say) a redacted membership event, it's possible that the
+refcount of an unwanted avatar might be greater than zero (due to the avatar
+being referenced in multiple rooms), but the room admin may want to still
+purge the content from their server. This can be achieved by DELETEing the
+content independently from redacting the membership events.
+
+## Tradeoffs
+
+Assuming that encrypted events don't reuse attachments is controversial but
+hopefully acceptable.  It does mean that stickers in encrypted rooms will end
+up getting re-encrypted/decrypted every time, but is hopefully be acceptable
+given the resulting improvement in privacy.
+
+## Security considerations
+
+Media repo implementations might want to use `srm` or a similar secure
+deletion tool to scrub deleted data off disk.
+
+If the same attachment is sent multiple times across encrypted events (even if
+encrypted separately per event), it's worth noting that the size of the
+encrypted attachment and associated traffic patterns will be an easy way to
+identify attachment reuse (e.g. who's forwarding a sensitive file to each
+other).