This repository contains a red team-oriented catalog of attack vectors targeting AI systems including autonomous agents (MCP, LangGraph, AutoGPT), RAG pipelines, vector databases, and embedding-based retrieval systems, along with individual proof-of-concepts (PoCs) for each.
catalog/AgentNull_Catalog.md
— Human-readable threat catalogcatalog/AgentNull_Catalog.json
— Structured version for SOC/SIEM ingestionpocs/
— One directory per attack vector, each with its own README, code, and sample input/output
This repository is for educational and internal security research purposes only. Do not deploy any techniques or code herein in production or against systems you do not own or have explicit authorization to test.
Navigate into each pocs/<attack_name>/
folder and follow the README to replicate the attack scenario.
For enhanced PoC demonstrations without API costs, use Ollama with local models:
# Linux/macOS
curl -fsSL https://ollama.ai/install.sh | sh
# Or download from https://ollama.ai/download
# Pull a lightweight model (recommended for testing)
ollama pull gemma3
# Or use a more capable model
ollama pull deepseek-r1
ollama pull qwen3
# Advanced Tool Poisoning with real LLM
cd pocs/AdvancedToolPoisoning
python3 advanced_tool_poisoning_agent.py local
# Other PoCs work with simulation mode
cd pocs/ContextPackingAttacks
python3 context_packing_agent.py
- Default endpoint:
http://localhost:11434
- Model selection: Edit the model name in PoC files if needed
- Performance: Llama2 (~4GB RAM), Mistral (~4GB RAM), CodeLlama (~4GB RAM)
- ⭐ Full-Schema Poisoning (FSP) - Exploit any field in tool schema beyond descriptions
- ⭐ Advanced Tool Poisoning Attack (ATPA) - Manipulate tool outputs to trigger secondary actions
- ⭐ MCP Rug Pull Attack - Swap benign descriptions for malicious ones after approval
- ⭐ Schema Validation Bypass - Exploit client validation implementation differences
- Tool Confusion Attack - Trick agents into using wrong tools via naming similarity
- Nested Function Call Hijack - Use JSON-like data to trigger dangerous function calls
- Subprompt Extraction - Induce agents to reveal system instructions or tools
- Backdoor Planning - Inject future intent into multi-step planning for exfiltration
- Recursive Leakage - Secrets leak through context summarization
- Token Gaslighting - Push safety instructions out of context via token spam
- Heuristic Drift Injection - Poison agent logic with repeated insecure patterns
- ⭐ Context Packing Attacks - Overflow context windows to truncate safety instructions
- ⭐ Cross-Embedding Poisoning - Manipulate embeddings to increase malicious content retrieval
- ⭐ Index Skew Attacks - Bias vector indices to favor malicious content (theoretical)
- ⭐ Zero-Shot Vector Beaconing - Embed latent activation patterns for covert signaling (theoretical)
- ⭐ Embedding Feedback Loops - Poison continual learning systems (theoretical)
- Hidden File Exploitation - Get agents to modify
.env
,.git
, or internal config files
- Function Flooding - Generate recursive tool calls to overwhelm budgets/APIs
- Semantic DoS - Trigger infinite generation or open-ended tasks
The attack vectors marked with ⭐ represent novel concepts primarily developed within the AgentNull project, extending beyond existing documented attack patterns.
- Recursive Leakage: Lost in the Middle: How Language Models Use Long Contexts
- Heuristic Drift Injection: Poisoning Web-Scale Training Data is Practical
- Tool Confusion Attack: LLM-as-a-judge
- Token Gaslighting: RAG vs Fine-tuning: Pipelines, Tradeoffs, and a Case Study on Agriculture
- Function Flooding: Denial-of-Service Attack on Test-Time-Tuning Models
- Hidden File Exploitation: OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications
- Backdoor Planning: Backdoor Attacks on Language Models
- Nested Function Call Hijack: OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications