Skip to content

github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/acme/api does not enforce HTTPS

Low severity GitHub Reviewed Published Aug 6, 2025 in go-acme/lego • Updated Aug 6, 2025

Package

gomod github.com/go-acme/lego (Go)

Affected versions

<= 4.25.1

Patched versions

None
gomod github.com/go-acme/lego/v3 (Go)
<= 4.25.1
None
gomod github.com/go-acme/lego/v4 (Go)
<= 4.25.1
4.25.2

Description

Summary

It was discovered that the github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/acme/api package (thus the lego library and the lego cli as well) don't enforce HTTPS when talking to CAs as an ACME client.

Details

Unlike the http-01 challenge which solves an ACME challenge over unencrypted HTTP, the ACME protocol requires HTTPS when a client communicates with the CA to performs ACME functions. This is stated in 6.1 of RFC 8555: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8555#section-6.1

Each ACME function is accomplished by the client sending a sequence
of HTTPS requests to the server [RFC2818], carrying JSON messages
[RFC8259]. Use of HTTPS is REQUIRED. Each subsection of Section 7
below describes the message formats used by the function and the
order in which messages are sent.

However, the library fails to enforce HTTPS both in the original discover URL (configured by the library user) and in the subsequent addresses returned by the CAs in the directory and order objects.

If the library user accidentally inputs an HTTP URL, or the CA similarly misconfigures its endpoints, this will cause the relevant parts of the protocol to be performed over HTTP. This can result, at the very least, in a lost of privacy of the request/response details, such as account and request identifiers (which could be intercepted by an attacker in a privileged network position). We did not investigate whether other more serious threats could result from the ability to impersonate a CA for some of the protocol requests, but enforcing HTTPS usage is definitely the safe choice.

Reproducing

This is illustrated in the attached http_acme_test.go. Since it uses private field Core.directory, this test must be placed inside the source directory of https://github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/acme/api to run.

Please note that this only checks getting the directory and creating a new account, but other ACME functions are likely impacted as well, such as creating orders, getting and checking order authorizations.

package api

import (
	"crypto/ecdsa"
	"crypto/elliptic"
	"crypto/rand"
	"fmt"
	"net/http"
	"strings"
	"testing"
	"time"

	"github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/acme"
)

const letsEncryptURLHTTP = "http://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory"
const letsEncryptURLHTTPS = "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory"

func changeToHTTP(url *string) {
	if strings.HasPrefix(*url, "https:") {
		*url = "http" + (*url)[len("https"):]
	}
}

func changeToHTTPS(url *string) {
	if strings.HasPrefix(*url, "http:") {
		*url = "https" + (*url)[len("http"):]
	}
}

func TestHTTPURLs(t *testing.T) {
	privateKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("error generating a private key: %v", err)
	}

	func() {
		t.Log("testing that Discover enforces https")
		_, err := New(&http.Client{
			Transport: &httpsOnlyRoundTripper{inner: http.DefaultTransport},
			Timeout:   20 * time.Second,
		}, "", letsEncryptURLHTTP, "", privateKey)
		if err != nil {
			t.Errorf("New error: %v", err)
		}
	}()

	core, err := New(&http.Client{
		Transport: &httpsOnlyRoundTripper{inner: http.DefaultTransport},
		Timeout:   20 * time.Second,
	}, "", letsEncryptURLHTTPS, "", privateKey)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("New error: %v", err)
	}

	func() {
		t.Log("testing that account creation enforces https")

		// Simulate a misconfigured CA that gives out HTTP directory URLs and when
		// we're done change it back to HTTPS to test the rest.
		changeToHTTP(&core.directory.NewAccountURL)
		defer changeToHTTPS(&core.directory.NewAccountURL)

		_, err := core.Accounts.New(acme.Account{
			TermsOfServiceAgreed: true,
			Contact:              []string{},
		})
		if err != nil {
			t.Errorf("core.Accounts.New error: %v", err)
		}
	}()

	_, err = core.Accounts.New(acme.Account{
		TermsOfServiceAgreed: true,
		Contact:              []string{},
	})
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("core.Accounts.New error: %v", err)
	}
}

type httpsOnlyRoundTripper struct {
	inner http.RoundTripper
}

func (r *httpsOnlyRoundTripper) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
	if req.URL.Scheme != "https" {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("non-https request is being sent")
	}
	return r.inner.RoundTrip(req)
}

_

References

@ldez ldez published to go-acme/lego Aug 6, 2025
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Aug 6, 2025
Reviewed Aug 6, 2025
Last updated Aug 6, 2025

Severity

Low

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity High
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction Passive
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity None
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2025-54799

GHSA ID

GHSA-q82r-2j7m-9rv4

Source code

Credits

Loading Checking history
See something to contribute? Suggest improvements for this vulnerability.