imgtool: Add support for multiple signatures

This patch adds support for multiple signatures to single image.
This is useful for scenarios where multiple keys are used to sign
images, allowing for greater flexibility and security in the
image verification process.
The tool command line interface is extended to support multiple
signatures.

The imgtool test suite is updated to test the new functionality.

Change-Id: I285b426671f6ad76472f0a2f8fb3a330f8882c3d
Signed-off-by: Maulik Patel <maulik.patel@arm.com>

Author: maulik-arm

scripts/imgtool/image.py

@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ def __init__(self, version=None, header_size=IMAGE_HEADER_SIZE,
         self.enctlv_len = 0
         self.max_align = max(DEFAULT_MAX_ALIGN, align) if max_align is None else int(max_align)
         self.non_bootable = non_bootable
+        self.key_ids = None
 
         if self.max_align == DEFAULT_MAX_ALIGN:
             self.boot_magic = bytes([
@@ -464,32 +465,40 @@ def ecies_hkdf(self, enckey, plainkey):
                 format=PublicFormat.Raw)
         return cipherkey, ciphermac, pubk
 
-    def create(self, key, public_key_format, enckey, dependencies=None,
+    def create(self, keys, public_key_format, enckey, dependencies=None,
                sw_type=None, custom_tlvs=None, compression_tlvs=None,
                compression_type=None, encrypt_keylen=128, clear=False,
                fixed_sig=None, pub_key=None, vector_to_sign=None,
                user_sha='auto', is_pure=False, keep_comp_size=False, dont_encrypt=False):
         self.enckey = enckey
 
-        # key decides on sha, then pub_key; of both are none default is used
-        check_key = key if key is not None else pub_key
+        # key decides on sha, then pub_key; if both are none default is used
+        check_key = keys[0] if keys[0] is not None else pub_key
         hash_algorithm, hash_tlv = key_and_user_sha_to_alg_and_tlv(check_key, user_sha, is_pure)
 
         # Calculate the hash of the public key
-        if key is not None:
-            pub = key.get_public_bytes()
-            sha = hash_algorithm()
-            sha.update(pub)
-            pubbytes = sha.digest()
-        elif pub_key is not None:
-            if hasattr(pub_key, 'sign'):
-                print(os.path.basename(__file__) + ": sign the payload")
-            pub = pub_key.get_public_bytes()
-            sha = hash_algorithm()
-            sha.update(pub)
-            pubbytes = sha.digest()
+        pub_digests = []
+        pub_list = []
+
+        if keys is None:
+            if pub_key is not None:
+                if hasattr(pub_key, 'sign'):
+                    print(os.path.basename(__file__) + ": sign the payload")
+                pub = pub_key.get_public_bytes()
+                sha = hash_algorithm()
+                sha.update(pub)
+                pubbytes = sha.digest()
+            else:
+                pubbytes = bytes(hashlib.sha256().digest_size)
         else:
-            pubbytes = bytes(hashlib.sha256().digest_size)
+            for key in keys or []:
+                pub = key.get_public_bytes()
+                sha = hash_algorithm()
+                sha.update(pub)
+                pubbytes = sha.digest()
+                pub_digests.append(pubbytes)
+                pub_list.append(pub)
+
 
         protected_tlv_size = 0
 
@@ -517,10 +526,14 @@ def create(self, key, public_key_format, enckey, dependencies=None,
             # value later.
             digest = bytes(hash_algorithm().digest_size)
 
+            if pub_digests:
+                boot_pub_digest = pub_digests[0]
+            else:
+                boot_pub_digest = pubbytes
             # Create CBOR encoded boot record
             boot_record = create_sw_component_data(sw_type, image_version,
                                                    hash_tlv, digest,
-                                                   pubbytes)
+                                                   boot_pub_digest)
 
             protected_tlv_size += TLV_SIZE + len(boot_record)
 
@@ -639,33 +652,39 @@ def create(self, key, public_key_format, enckey, dependencies=None,
             print(os.path.basename(__file__) + ': export digest')
             return
 
-        if self.key_ids is not None:
-            self._add_key_id_tlv_to_unprotected(tlv, self.key_ids[0])
+        if fixed_sig is not None and keys is not None:
+            raise click.UsageError("Can not sign using key and provide fixed-signature at the same time")
 
-        if key is not None or fixed_sig is not None:
-            if public_key_format == 'hash':
-                tlv.add('KEYHASH', pubbytes)
-            else:
-                tlv.add('PUBKEY', pub)
+        if fixed_sig is not None:
+            tlv.add(pub_key.sig_tlv(), fixed_sig['value'])
+            self.signatures[0] = fixed_sig['value']
+        else:
+            # Multi-signature handling: iterate through each provided key and sign.
+            self.signatures = []
+            for i, key in enumerate(keys):
+                # If key IDs are provided, and we have enough for this key, add it first.
+                if self.key_ids is not None and len(self.key_ids) > i:
+                    # Convert key id (an integer) to 4-byte big-endian bytes.
+                    kid_bytes = self.key_ids[i].to_bytes(4, 'big')
+                    tlv.add('KEYID', kid_bytes)  # Using the TLV tag that corresponds to key IDs.
+
+                if public_key_format == 'hash':
+                    tlv.add('KEYHASH', pub_digests[i])
+                else:
+                    tlv.add('PUBKEY', pub_list[i])
 
-            if key is not None and fixed_sig is None:
                 # `sign` expects the full image payload (hashing done
                 # internally), while `sign_digest` expects only the digest
                 # of the payload
-
                 if hasattr(key, 'sign'):
                     print(os.path.basename(__file__) + ": sign the payload")
                     sig = key.sign(bytes(self.payload))
                 else:
                     print(os.path.basename(__file__) + ": sign the digest")
                     sig = key.sign_digest(message)
                 tlv.add(key.sig_tlv(), sig)
-                self.signature = sig
-            elif fixed_sig is not None and key is None:
-                tlv.add(pub_key.sig_tlv(), fixed_sig['value'])
-                self.signature = fixed_sig['value']
-            else:
-                raise click.UsageError("Can not sign using key and provide fixed-signature at the same time")
+                self.signatures.append(sig)
+
 
         # At this point the image was hashed + signed, we can remove the
         # protected TLVs from the payload (will be re-added later)
@@ -714,7 +733,7 @@ def get_struct_endian(self):
         return STRUCT_ENDIAN_DICT[self.endian]
 
     def get_signature(self):
-        return self.signature
+        return self.signatures
 
     def get_infile_data(self):
         return self.infile_data
@@ -824,75 +843,100 @@ def verify(imgfile, key):
         if magic != IMAGE_MAGIC:
             return VerifyResult.INVALID_MAGIC, None, None, None
 
-        tlv_off = header_size + img_size
+        # Locate the first TLV info header
+        base_tlv_off = header_size + img_size
+        tlv_off = base_tlv_off
         tlv_info = b[tlv_off:tlv_off + TLV_INFO_SIZE]
         magic, tlv_tot = struct.unpack('HH', tlv_info)
+
+        # If it's the protected-TLV block, skip it
         if magic == TLV_PROT_INFO_MAGIC:
-            tlv_off += tlv_tot
+            tlv_off += TLV_INFO_SIZE + tlv_tot
             tlv_info = b[tlv_off:tlv_off + TLV_INFO_SIZE]
             magic, tlv_tot = struct.unpack('HH', tlv_info)
 
         if magic != TLV_INFO_MAGIC:
             return VerifyResult.INVALID_TLV_INFO_MAGIC, None, None, None
 
-        # This is set by existence of TLV SIG_PURE
-        is_pure = False
+        # Define the unprotected-TLV window
+        unprot_off = tlv_off + TLV_INFO_SIZE
+        unprot_end = unprot_off + tlv_tot
 
-        prot_tlv_size = tlv_off
-        hash_region = b[:prot_tlv_size]
-        tlv_end = tlv_off + tlv_tot
-        tlv_off += TLV_INFO_SIZE  # skip tlv info
+        # Region up to the start of unprotected TLVs is hashed
+        prot_tlv_end = unprot_off - TLV_INFO_SIZE
+        hash_region = b[:prot_tlv_end]
 
-        # First scan all TLVs in search of SIG_PURE
-        while tlv_off < tlv_end:
-            tlv = b[tlv_off:tlv_off + TLV_SIZE]
+        # This is set by existence of TLV SIG_PURE
+        is_pure = False
+        scan_off = unprot_off
+        while scan_off < unprot_end:
+            tlv = b[scan_off:scan_off + TLV_SIZE]
             tlv_type, _, tlv_len = struct.unpack('BBH', tlv)
             if tlv_type == TLV_VALUES['SIG_PURE']:
                 is_pure = True
                 break
-            tlv_off += TLV_SIZE + tlv_len
+            scan_off += TLV_SIZE + tlv_len
 
+        if key is not None and not isinstance(key, list):
+            key = [key]
+
+        verify_results = []
+        scan_off = unprot_off
         digest = None
-        tlv_off = header_size + img_size
-        tlv_end = tlv_off + tlv_tot
-        tlv_off += TLV_INFO_SIZE  # skip tlv info
-        while tlv_off < tlv_end:
-            tlv = b[tlv_off:tlv_off + TLV_SIZE]
+        prot_tlv_size = unprot_off - TLV_INFO_SIZE
+
+        # Verify hash and signatures
+        while scan_off < unprot_end:
+            tlv = b[scan_off:scan_off + TLV_SIZE]
             tlv_type, _, tlv_len = struct.unpack('BBH', tlv)
             if is_sha_tlv(tlv_type):
-                if not tlv_matches_key_type(tlv_type, key):
+                if not tlv_matches_key_type(tlv_type, key[0]):
                     return VerifyResult.KEY_MISMATCH, None, None, None
-                off = tlv_off + TLV_SIZE
+                off = scan_off + TLV_SIZE
                 digest = get_digest(tlv_type, hash_region)
-                if digest == b[off:off + tlv_len]:
-                    if key is None:
-                        return VerifyResult.OK, version, digest, None
-                else:
-                    return VerifyResult.INVALID_HASH, None, None, None
-            elif not is_pure and key is not None and tlv_type == TLV_VALUES[key.sig_tlv()]:
-                off = tlv_off + TLV_SIZE
-                tlv_sig = b[off:off + tlv_len]
-                payload = b[:prot_tlv_size]
-                try:
-                    if hasattr(key, 'verify'):
-                        key.verify(tlv_sig, payload)
-                    else:
-                        key.verify_digest(tlv_sig, digest)
-                    return VerifyResult.OK, version, digest, None
-                except InvalidSignature:
-                    # continue to next TLV
-                    pass
+                if digest != b[off:off + tlv_len]:
+                    verify_results.append(("Digest", "INVALID_HASH"))
+
+            elif not is_pure and key is not None and tlv_type == TLV_VALUES[key[0].sig_tlv()]:
+                for idx, k in enumerate(key):
+                    if tlv_type == TLV_VALUES[k.sig_tlv()]:
+                        off = scan_off + TLV_SIZE
+                        tlv_sig = b[off:off + tlv_len]
+                        payload = b[:prot_tlv_size]
+                        try:
+                            if hasattr(k, 'verify'):
+                                k.verify(tlv_sig, payload)
+                            else:
+                                k.verify_digest(tlv_sig, digest)
+                            verify_results.append((f"Key {idx}", "OK"))
+                            break
+                        except InvalidSignature:
+                            # continue to next TLV
+                            verify_results.append((f"Key {idx}", "INVALID_SIGNATURE"))
+                            continue
+
             elif is_pure and key is not None and tlv_type in ALLOWED_PURE_SIG_TLVS:
-                off = tlv_off + TLV_SIZE
+                # pure signature verification
+                off = scan_off + TLV_SIZE
                 tlv_sig = b[off:off + tlv_len]
+                k = key[0]
                 try:
-                    key.verify_digest(tlv_sig, hash_region)
+                    k.verify_digest(tlv_sig, hash_region)
                     return VerifyResult.OK, version, None, tlv_sig
                 except InvalidSignature:
-                    # continue to next TLV
-                    pass
-            tlv_off += TLV_SIZE + tlv_len
-        return VerifyResult.INVALID_SIGNATURE, None, None, None
+                    return VerifyResult.INVALID_SIGNATURE, None, None, None
+
+            scan_off += TLV_SIZE + tlv_len
+        # Now print out the verification results:
+        for k, result in verify_results:
+            print(f"{k}: {result}")
+
+        # Decide on a final return (for example, OK only if at least one signature is valid)
+        if any(result == "OK" for _, result in verify_results):
+            return VerifyResult.OK, version, digest, None
+        else:
+            return VerifyResult.INVALID_SIGNATURE, None, None, None
+
 
     def set_key_ids(self, key_ids):
         """Set list of key IDs (integers) to be inserted before each signature."""