Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull x86 kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "x86:

   - KVM currently invalidates the entirety of the page tables, not just
     those for the memslot being touched, when a memslot is moved or
     deleted.

     This does not traditionally have particularly noticeable overhead,
     but Intel's TDX will require the guest to re-accept private pages
     if they are dropped from the secure EPT, which is a non starter.

     Actually, the only reason why this is not already being done is a
     bug which was never fully investigated and caused VM instability
     with assigned GeForce GPUs, so allow userspace to opt into the new
     behavior.

   - Advertise AVX10.1 to userspace (effectively prep work for the
     "real" AVX10 functionality that is on the horizon)

   - Rework common MSR handling code to suppress errors on userspace
     accesses to unsupported-but-advertised MSRs

     This will allow removing (almost?) all of KVM's exemptions for
     userspace access to MSRs that shouldn't exist based on the vCPU
     model (the actual cleanup is non-trivial future work)

   - Rework KVM's handling of x2APIC ICR, again, because AMD (x2AVIC)
     splits the 64-bit value into the legacy ICR and ICR2 storage,
     whereas Intel (APICv) stores the entire 64-bit value at the ICR
     offset

   - Fix a bug where KVM would fail to exit to userspace if one was
     triggered by a fastpath exit handler

   - Add fastpath handling of HLT VM-Exit to expedite re-entering the
     guest when there's already a pending wake event at the time of the
     exit

   - Fix a WARN caused by RSM entering a nested guest from SMM with
     invalid guest state, by forcing the vCPU out of guest mode prior to
     signalling SHUTDOWN (the SHUTDOWN hits the VM altogether, not the
     nested guest)

   - Overhaul the "unprotect and retry" logic to more precisely identify
     cases where retrying is actually helpful, and to harden all retry
     paths against putting the guest into an infinite retry loop

   - Add support for yielding, e.g. to honor NEED_RESCHED, when zapping
     rmaps in the shadow MMU

   - Refactor pieces of the shadow MMU related to aging SPTEs in
     prepartion for adding multi generation LRU support in KVM

   - Don't stuff the RSB after VM-Exit when RETPOLINE=y and AutoIBRS is
     enabled, i.e. when the CPU has already flushed the RSB

   - Trace the per-CPU host save area as a VMCB pointer to improve
     readability and cleanup the retrieval of the SEV-ES host save area

   - Remove unnecessary accounting of temporary nested VMCB related
     allocations

   - Set FINAL/PAGE in the page fault error code for EPT violations if
     and only if the GVA is valid. If the GVA is NOT valid, there is no
     guest-side page table walk and so stuffing paging related metadata
     is nonsensical

   - Fix a bug where KVM would incorrectly synthesize a nested VM-Exit
     instead of emulating posted interrupt delivery to L2

   - Add a lockdep assertion to detect unsafe accesses of vmcs12
     structures

   - Harden eVMCS loading against an impossible NULL pointer deref
     (really truly should be impossible)

   - Minor SGX fix and a cleanup

   - Misc cleanups

  Generic:

   - Register KVM's cpuhp and syscore callbacks when enabling
     virtualization in hardware, as the sole purpose of said callbacks
     is to disable and re-enable virtualization as needed

   - Enable virtualization when KVM is loaded, not right before the
     first VM is created

     Together with the previous change, this simplifies a lot the logic
     of the callbacks, because their very existence implies
     virtualization is enabled

   - Fix a bug that results in KVM prematurely exiting to userspace for
     coalesced MMIO/PIO in many cases, clean up the related code, and
     add a testcase

   - Fix a bug in kvm_clear_guest() where it would trigger a buffer
     overflow _if_ the gpa+len crosses a page boundary, which thankfully
     is guaranteed to not happen in the current code base. Add WARNs in
     more helpers that read/write guest memory to detect similar bugs

  Selftests:

   - Fix a goof that caused some Hyper-V tests to be skipped when run on
     bare metal, i.e. NOT in a VM

   - Add a regression test for KVM's handling of SHUTDOWN for an SEV-ES
     guest

   - Explicitly include one-off assets in .gitignore. Past Sean was
     completely wrong about not being able to detect missing .gitignore
     entries

   - Verify userspace single-stepping works when KVM happens to handle a
     VM-Exit in its fastpath

   - Misc cleanups"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (127 commits)
  Documentation: KVM: fix warning in "make htmldocs"
  s390: Enable KVM_S390_UCONTROL config in debug_defconfig
  selftests: kvm: s390: Add VM run test case
  KVM: SVM: let alternatives handle the cases when RSB filling is required
  KVM: VMX: Set PFERR_GUEST_{FINAL,PAGE}_MASK if and only if the GVA is valid
  KVM: x86/mmu: Use KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE() instead of an open coded equivalent
  KVM: x86/mmu: Add KVM_RMAP_MANY to replace open coded '1' and '1ul' literals
  KVM: x86/mmu: Fold mmu_spte_age() into kvm_rmap_age_gfn_range()
  KVM: x86/mmu: Morph kvm_handle_gfn_range() into an aging specific helper
  KVM: x86/mmu: Honor NEED_RESCHED when zapping rmaps and blocking is allowed
  KVM: x86/mmu: Add a helper to walk and zap rmaps for a memslot
  KVM: x86/mmu: Plumb a @can_yield parameter into __walk_slot_rmaps()
  KVM: x86/mmu: Move walk_slot_rmaps() up near for_each_slot_rmap_range()
  KVM: x86/mmu: WARN on MMIO cache hit when emulating write-protected gfn
  KVM: x86/mmu: Detect if unprotect will do anything based on invalid_list
  KVM: x86/mmu: Subsume kvm_mmu_unprotect_page() into the and_retry() version
  KVM: x86: Rename reexecute_instruction()=>kvm_unprotect_and_retry_on_failure()
  KVM: x86: Update retry protection fields when forcing retry on emulation failure
  KVM: x86: Apply retry protection to "unprotect on failure" path
  KVM: x86: Check EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP before unprotecting gfn
  ...

Author: torvalds

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -2677,6 +2677,23 @@
 
 			Default is Y (on).
 
+	kvm.enable_virt_at_load=[KVM,ARM64,LOONGARCH,MIPS,RISCV,X86]
+			If enabled, KVM will enable virtualization in hardware
+			when KVM is loaded, and disable virtualization when KVM
+			is unloaded (if KVM is built as a module).
+
+			If disabled, KVM will dynamically enable and disable
+			virtualization on-demand when creating and destroying
+			VMs, i.e. on the 0=>1 and 1=>0 transitions of the
+			number of VMs.
+
+			Enabling virtualization at module lode avoids potential
+			latency for creation of the 0=>1 VM, as KVM serializes
+			virtualization enabling across all online CPUs.  The
+			"cost" of enabling virtualization when KVM is loaded,
+			is that doing so may interfere with using out-of-tree
+			hypervisors that want to "own" virtualization hardware.
+
 	kvm.enable_vmware_backdoor=[KVM] Support VMware backdoor PV interface.
 				   Default is false (don't support).
 

Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst

@@ -4214,7 +4214,9 @@ whether or not KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR's KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER is
 enabled.  If KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER is enabled, KVM will exit to userspace
 on denied accesses, i.e. userspace effectively intercepts the MSR access.  If
 KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER is not enabled, KVM will inject a #GP into the guest
-on denied accesses.
+on denied accesses.  Note, if an MSR access is denied during emulation of MSR
+load/stores during VMX transitions, KVM ignores KVM_MSR_EXIT_REASON_FILTER.
+See the below warning for full details.
 
 If an MSR access is allowed by userspace, KVM will emulate and/or virtualize
 the access in accordance with the vCPU model.  Note, KVM may still ultimately
@@ -4229,9 +4231,22 @@ filtering. In that mode, ``KVM_MSR_FILTER_DEFAULT_DENY`` is invalid and causes
 an error.
 
 .. warning::
-   MSR accesses as part of nested VM-Enter/VM-Exit are not filtered.
-   This includes both writes to individual VMCS fields and reads/writes
-   through the MSR lists pointed to by the VMCS.
+   MSR accesses that are side effects of instruction execution (emulated or
+   native) are not filtered as hardware does not honor MSR bitmaps outside of
+   RDMSR and WRMSR, and KVM mimics that behavior when emulating instructions
+   to avoid pointless divergence from hardware.  E.g. RDPID reads MSR_TSC_AUX,
+   SYSENTER reads the SYSENTER MSRs, etc.
+
+   MSRs that are loaded/stored via dedicated VMCS fields are not filtered as
+   part of VM-Enter/VM-Exit emulation.
+
+   MSRs that are loaded/store via VMX's load/store lists _are_ filtered as part
+   of VM-Enter/VM-Exit emulation.  If an MSR access is denied on VM-Enter, KVM
+   synthesizes a consistency check VM-Exit(EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL).  If an
+   MSR access is denied on VM-Exit, KVM synthesizes a VM-Abort.  In short, KVM
+   extends Intel's architectural list of MSRs that cannot be loaded/saved via
+   the VM-Enter/VM-Exit MSR list.  It is platform owner's responsibility to
+   to communicate any such restrictions to their end users.
 
    x2APIC MSR accesses cannot be filtered (KVM silently ignores filters that
    cover any x2APIC MSRs).
@@ -8082,6 +8097,14 @@ KVM_X86_QUIRK_MWAIT_NEVER_UD_FAULTS By default, KVM emulates MONITOR/MWAIT (if
                                     guest CPUID on writes to MISC_ENABLE if
                                     KVM_X86_QUIRK_MISC_ENABLE_NO_MWAIT is
                                     disabled.
+
+KVM_X86_QUIRK_SLOT_ZAP_ALL          By default, KVM invalidates all SPTEs in
+                                    fast way for memslot deletion when VM type
+                                    is KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.
+                                    When this quirk is disabled or when VM type
+                                    is other than KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM, KVM zaps
+                                    only leaf SPTEs that are within the range of
+                                    the memslot being deleted.
 =================================== ============================================
 
 7.32 KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID

Documentation/virt/kvm/locking.rst

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ The acquisition orders for mutexes are as follows:
 
 - cpus_read_lock() is taken outside kvm_lock
 
+- kvm_usage_lock is taken outside cpus_read_lock()
+
 - kvm->lock is taken outside vcpu->mutex
 
 - kvm->lock is taken outside kvm->slots_lock and kvm->irq_lock
@@ -24,6 +26,13 @@ The acquisition orders for mutexes are as follows:
   are taken on the waiting side when modifying memslots, so MMU notifiers
   must not take either kvm->slots_lock or kvm->slots_arch_lock.
 
+cpus_read_lock() vs kvm_lock:
+
+- Taking cpus_read_lock() outside of kvm_lock is problematic, despite that
+  being the official ordering, as it is quite easy to unknowingly trigger
+  cpus_read_lock() while holding kvm_lock.  Use caution when walking vm_list,
+  e.g. avoid complex operations when possible.
+
 For SRCU:
 
 - ``synchronize_srcu(&kvm->srcu)`` is called inside critical sections
@@ -227,10 +236,16 @@ time it will be set using the Dirty tracking mechanism described above.
 :Type:		mutex
 :Arch:		any
 :Protects:	- vm_list
-		- kvm_usage_count
+
+``kvm_usage_lock``
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+:Type:		mutex
+:Arch:		any
+:Protects:	- kvm_usage_count
 		- hardware virtualization enable/disable
-:Comment:	KVM also disables CPU hotplug via cpus_read_lock() during
-		enable/disable.
+:Comment:	Exists to allow taking cpus_read_lock() while kvm_usage_count is
+		protected, which simplifies the virtualization enabling logic.
 
 ``kvm->mn_invalidate_lock``
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
@@ -290,11 +305,12 @@ time it will be set using the Dirty tracking mechanism described above.
 		wakeup.
 
 ``vendor_module_lock``
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 :Type:		mutex
 :Arch:		x86
 :Protects:	loading a vendor module (kvm_amd or kvm_intel)
-:Comment:	Exists because using kvm_lock leads to deadlock.  cpu_hotplug_lock is
-    taken outside of kvm_lock, e.g. in KVM's CPU online/offline callbacks, and
-    many operations need to take cpu_hotplug_lock when loading a vendor module,
-    e.g. updating static calls.
+:Comment:	Exists because using kvm_lock leads to deadlock.  kvm_lock is taken
+    in notifiers, e.g. __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(), that may be invoked while
+    cpu_hotplug_lock is held, e.g. from cpufreq_boost_trigger_state(), and many
+    operations need to take cpu_hotplug_lock when loading a vendor module, e.g.
+    updating static calls.

arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c

@@ -2164,7 +2164,7 @@ static void cpu_hyp_uninit(void *discard)
 	}
 }
 
-int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
+int kvm_arch_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Most calls to this function are made with migration
@@ -2184,7 +2184,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void kvm_arch_hardware_disable(void)
+void kvm_arch_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 {
 	kvm_timer_cpu_down();
 	kvm_vgic_cpu_down();
@@ -2380,7 +2380,7 @@ static int __init do_pkvm_init(u32 hyp_va_bits)
 
 	/*
 	 * The stub hypercalls are now disabled, so set our local flag to
-	 * prevent a later re-init attempt in kvm_arch_hardware_enable().
+	 * prevent a later re-init attempt in kvm_arch_enable_virtualization_cpu().
 	 */
 	__this_cpu_write(kvm_hyp_initialized, 1);
 	preempt_enable();

arch/loongarch/kvm/main.c

@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
 }
 
-int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
+int kvm_arch_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 {
 	unsigned long env, gcfg = 0;
 
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void kvm_arch_hardware_disable(void)
+void kvm_arch_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 {
 	write_csr_gcfg(0);
 	write_csr_gstat(0);

arch/mips/include/asm/kvm_host.h

@@ -728,8 +728,8 @@ struct kvm_mips_callbacks {
 	int (*handle_fpe)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 	int (*handle_msa_disabled)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 	int (*handle_guest_exit)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-	int (*hardware_enable)(void);
-	void (*hardware_disable)(void);
+	int (*enable_virtualization_cpu)(void);
+	void (*disable_virtualization_cpu)(void);
 	int (*check_extension)(struct kvm *kvm, long ext);
 	int (*vcpu_init)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 	void (*vcpu_uninit)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

arch/mips/kvm/mips.c

@@ -125,14 +125,14 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
+int kvm_arch_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 {
-	return kvm_mips_callbacks->hardware_enable();
+	return kvm_mips_callbacks->enable_virtualization_cpu();
 }
 
-void kvm_arch_hardware_disable(void)
+void kvm_arch_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 {
-	kvm_mips_callbacks->hardware_disable();
+	kvm_mips_callbacks->disable_virtualization_cpu();
 }
 
 int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)

arch/mips/kvm/vz.c

@@ -2869,7 +2869,7 @@ static unsigned int kvm_vz_resize_guest_vtlb(unsigned int size)
 	return ret + 1;
 }
 
-static int kvm_vz_hardware_enable(void)
+static int kvm_vz_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 {
 	unsigned int mmu_size, guest_mmu_size, ftlb_size;
 	u64 guest_cvmctl, cvmvmconfig;
@@ -2983,7 +2983,7 @@ static int kvm_vz_hardware_enable(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void kvm_vz_hardware_disable(void)
+static void kvm_vz_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 {
 	u64 cvmvmconfig;
 	unsigned int mmu_size;
@@ -3280,8 +3280,8 @@ static struct kvm_mips_callbacks kvm_vz_callbacks = {
 	.handle_msa_disabled = kvm_trap_vz_handle_msa_disabled,
 	.handle_guest_exit = kvm_trap_vz_handle_guest_exit,
 
-	.hardware_enable = kvm_vz_hardware_enable,
-	.hardware_disable = kvm_vz_hardware_disable,
+	.enable_virtualization_cpu = kvm_vz_enable_virtualization_cpu,
+	.disable_virtualization_cpu = kvm_vz_disable_virtualization_cpu,
 	.check_extension = kvm_vz_check_extension,
 	.vcpu_init = kvm_vz_vcpu_init,
 	.vcpu_uninit = kvm_vz_vcpu_uninit,

arch/riscv/kvm/main.c

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
+int kvm_arch_enable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 {
 	csr_write(CSR_HEDELEG, KVM_HEDELEG_DEFAULT);
 	csr_write(CSR_HIDELEG, KVM_HIDELEG_DEFAULT);
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void kvm_arch_hardware_disable(void)
+void kvm_arch_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
 {
 	kvm_riscv_aia_disable();
 

arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ CONFIG_CMM=m
 CONFIG_APPLDATA_BASE=y
 CONFIG_S390_HYPFS_FS=y
 CONFIG_KVM=m
+CONFIG_KVM_S390_UCONTROL=y
 CONFIG_S390_UNWIND_SELFTEST=m
 CONFIG_S390_KPROBES_SANITY_TEST=m
 CONFIG_S390_MODULES_SANITY_TEST=m