Replies: 5 comments 9 replies
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imho something like I proposed in tg https://t.me/IdenaNetworkPublic/355310
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Great, you really want everyone to withdraw from IDENA. |
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As long as the report system provides a mediocre accuracy (reportable flips being not reported and non-reportable flips being reported), we should be careful about increasing the rewards of the reporters and penalty of the reported. Especially, if report rewards becomes quadratic, many identities won't have an incentive to report anymore. If the goal is to penalize flips created by flip farms I would suggest to consider this proposal: #134 which would prevent identities with a score below 92% to participate in the report session. This would remove a higher share of identities linked to flip farms as those struggle more to maintain a high share of identities with a score above 92%. |
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@0JustinMiles0, quite an interesting point of view. However, it could delve even deeper, depending on identity status, the weight of the report vote could vary. Furthermore, we could incorporate the entire statistics of all created flips, using the proportion between created and bad (reported) flips to adjust the weight. The reward mechanism for individuals on the report committee could be based on the validation fund of the reported identity, with the proportion determined by their stake (quadratic coefficient) and the points each identity accumulates to ensure the success of the report. In other words, a flip could be reported not based on consensus but rather on the threshold of points required for it to be considered as reported. For example, we could establish a scale of 0 to 10 points for each report, taking into account factors such as the status and age of the identity, the ratio of good to bad flips, the frequency of flip reports by the identity, and the success rate of those reports. If the proportion leans towards false reports, the weight of the report could be relatively low. For example, if we consider a report committee of each flip as 10 identities, and each identity can contribute a maximum of 10 points to the report total value, then the total maximum report points would be 100. This scale provides a robust framework for conducting a thorough assessment of flip quality. Furthermore, such a scale ensures that the rewards we intend to distribute will be allocated to deserving identities based on their individual contributions and personal rating levels. Certainly, with such a finely-tuned scale, we could establish a specific threshold for reducing the mining rewards of identities, contingent upon the number of report points assigned to each identity's flip. Based on this threshold, we could calculate the percentage of mining rewards allocated to the report committees that participated in assessing each flip. This calculation would take into consideration the previously mentioned factors, if the reported identity continues to engage in mining during the epoch. So, as a summary, the report reward fund would be funded by a validation rewards of the reported identity and a percentage of the mining rewards of the reported identity determined by the reporting scale based on the report composite score |
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reanimating this thread
https://discord.com/channels/634481767352369162/1255583086213730424/1264900056730046464
rough summary of the proposal: 3 created flips: 2+ reported flips = suspended *A separate (or perhaps no new) rule should be applied to newbies since they can't be suspended |
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The correct report should halt the mining process of the bad actor identity for the entire epoch. Identities that have reported the bad flip should receive all validation rewards from the reported identity, distributed in quadratic proportion based on the stake of each identity who took part in a report committee. As of now, the validation rewards of the bad actor simply merges with the overall validation rewards pool. I believe this kind of behavior would motivate users to monitor farmers' template flips more tightly.
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