Merge pull request #8229 from erik-krogh/parenSan

JS: step through parentheses in barrier functions

Author: erik-krogh

javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/dataflow/Configuration.qll

@@ -1977,20 +1977,26 @@ module PathGraph {
 }
 
 /**
- * Gets an operand of the given `&&` operator.
- *
- * We use this to construct the transitive closure over a relation
- * that does not include all of `BinaryExpr.getAnOperand`.
+ * Gets a logical `and` expression, or parenthesized expression, that contains `guard`.
  */
-private Expr getALogicalAndOperand(LogAndExpr e) { result = e.getAnOperand() }
+private Expr getALogicalAndParent(BarrierGuardNode guard) {
+  barrierGuardIsRelevant(guard) and result = guard.asExpr()
+  or
+  result.(LogAndExpr).getAnOperand() = getALogicalAndParent(guard)
+  or
+  result.getUnderlyingValue() = getALogicalAndParent(guard)
+}
 
 /**
- * Gets an operand of the given `||` operator.
- *
- * We use this to construct the transitive closure over a relation
- * that does not include all of `BinaryExpr.getAnOperand`.
+ * Gets a logical `or` expression, or parenthesized expression, that contains `guard`.
  */
-private Expr getALogicalOrOperand(LogOrExpr e) { result = e.getAnOperand() }
+private Expr getALogicalOrParent(BarrierGuardNode guard) {
+  barrierGuardIsRelevant(guard) and result = guard.asExpr()
+  or
+  result.(LogOrExpr).getAnOperand() = getALogicalOrParent(guard)
+  or
+  result.getUnderlyingValue() = getALogicalOrParent(guard)
+}
 
 /**
  * A `BarrierGuardNode` that controls which data flow
@@ -2020,10 +2026,10 @@ private class BarrierGuardFunction extends Function {
         returnExpr = guard.asExpr()
         or
         // ad hoc support for conjunctions:
-        getALogicalAndOperand+(returnExpr) = guard.asExpr() and guardOutcome = true
+        getALogicalAndParent(guard) = returnExpr and guardOutcome = true
         or
         // ad hoc support for disjunctions:
-        getALogicalOrOperand+(returnExpr) = guard.asExpr() and guardOutcome = false
+        getALogicalOrParent(guard) = returnExpr and guardOutcome = false
       |
         exists(SsaExplicitDefinition ssa |
           ssa.getDef().getSource() = returnExpr and

javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-915/PrototypePollutingAssignment/PrototypePollutingAssignment.expected

@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@ nodes
 | lib.js:92:3:92:12 | maybeProto |
 | lib.js:95:3:95:12 | maybeProto |
 | lib.js:95:3:95:12 | maybeProto |
+| lib.js:104:7:104:24 | one |
+| lib.js:104:13:104:24 | arguments[1] |
+| lib.js:104:13:104:24 | arguments[1] |
+| lib.js:108:3:108:10 | obj[one] |
+| lib.js:108:3:108:10 | obj[one] |
+| lib.js:108:7:108:9 | one |
 | tst.js:5:9:5:38 | taint |
 | tst.js:5:17:5:38 | String( ... y.data) |
 | tst.js:5:24:5:37 | req.query.data |
@@ -219,6 +225,11 @@ edges
 | lib.js:91:7:91:28 | maybeProto | lib.js:95:3:95:12 | maybeProto |
 | lib.js:91:20:91:28 | obj[path] | lib.js:91:7:91:28 | maybeProto |
 | lib.js:91:24:91:27 | path | lib.js:91:20:91:28 | obj[path] |
+| lib.js:104:7:104:24 | one | lib.js:108:7:108:9 | one |
+| lib.js:104:13:104:24 | arguments[1] | lib.js:104:7:104:24 | one |
+| lib.js:104:13:104:24 | arguments[1] | lib.js:104:7:104:24 | one |
+| lib.js:108:7:108:9 | one | lib.js:108:3:108:10 | obj[one] |
+| lib.js:108:7:108:9 | one | lib.js:108:3:108:10 | obj[one] |
 | tst.js:5:9:5:38 | taint | tst.js:8:12:8:16 | taint |
 | tst.js:5:9:5:38 | taint | tst.js:9:12:9:16 | taint |
 | tst.js:5:9:5:38 | taint | tst.js:12:25:12:29 | taint |
@@ -272,6 +283,7 @@ edges
 | lib.js:42:3:42:14 | obj[path[0]] | lib.js:40:14:40:20 | args[1] | lib.js:42:3:42:14 | obj[path[0]] | This assignment may alter Object.prototype if a malicious '__proto__' string is injected from $@. | lib.js:40:14:40:20 | args[1] | library input |
 | lib.js:70:13:70:24 | obj[path[0]] | lib.js:59:18:59:18 | s | lib.js:70:13:70:24 | obj[path[0]] | This assignment may alter Object.prototype if a malicious '__proto__' string is injected from $@. | lib.js:59:18:59:18 | s | library input |
 | lib.js:87:10:87:14 | proto | lib.js:83:14:83:25 | arguments[1] | lib.js:87:10:87:14 | proto | This assignment may alter Object.prototype if a malicious '__proto__' string is injected from $@. | lib.js:83:14:83:25 | arguments[1] | library input |
+| lib.js:108:3:108:10 | obj[one] | lib.js:104:13:104:24 | arguments[1] | lib.js:108:3:108:10 | obj[one] | This assignment may alter Object.prototype if a malicious '__proto__' string is injected from $@. | lib.js:104:13:104:24 | arguments[1] | library input |
 | tst.js:8:5:8:17 | object[taint] | tst.js:5:24:5:37 | req.query.data | tst.js:8:5:8:17 | object[taint] | This assignment may alter Object.prototype if a malicious '__proto__' string is injected from $@. | tst.js:5:24:5:37 | req.query.data | user controlled input |
 | tst.js:9:5:9:17 | object[taint] | tst.js:5:24:5:37 | req.query.data | tst.js:9:5:9:17 | object[taint] | This assignment may alter Object.prototype if a malicious '__proto__' string is injected from $@. | tst.js:5:24:5:37 | req.query.data | user controlled input |
 | tst.js:14:5:14:32 | unsafeG ...  taint) | tst.js:5:24:5:37 | req.query.data | tst.js:14:5:14:32 | unsafeG ...  taint) | This assignment may alter Object.prototype if a malicious '__proto__' string is injected from $@. | tst.js:5:24:5:37 | req.query.data | user controlled input |

javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-915/PrototypePollutingAssignment/lib.js

@@ -93,4 +93,22 @@ module.exports.fixedProp = function (obj, path, value) {
 
   var i = 0;
   maybeProto[i + 2] = value; // OK - number properties are OK.
-}
+}
+
+function isPossibilityOfPrototypePollution(key) {
+  return (key === '__proto__' || key === 'constructor');
+}
+
+module.exports.sanWithFcuntion = function() {
+  var obj = arguments[0];
+  var one = arguments[1];
+  var two = arguments[2];
+  var value = arguments[3];
+  
+  obj[one][two] = value; // NOT OK
+
+  if (isPossibilityOfPrototypePollution(one) || isPossibilityOfPrototypePollution(two)) {
+    throw new Error('Prototype pollution is not allowed');
+  }
+  obj[one][two] = value; // OK
+}