silentpayments: sending

Add a routine for the entire sending flow which takes a set of private keys,
the smallest outpoint, and list of recipients and returns a list of
x-only public keys by performing the following steps:

1. Sum up the private keys
2. Calculate the input_hash
3. For each recipient group:
    3a. Calculate a shared secret
    3b. Create the requested number of outputs

This function assumes a single sender context in that it requires the
sender to have access to all of the private keys. In the future, this
API may be expanded to allow for a multiple senders or for a single
sender who does not have access to all private keys at any given time,
but for now these modes are considered out of scope / unsafe.

Internal to the library, add:

1. A function for creating shared secrets (i.e., a*B or b*A)
2. A function for generating the "SharedSecret" tagged hash
3. A function for creating a single output public key

Author: josibake

include/secp256k1_silentpayments.h

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #define SECP256K1_SILENTPAYMENTS_H
 
 #include "secp256k1.h"
+#include "secp256k1_extrakeys.h"
 
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
@@ -25,6 +26,92 @@ extern "C" {
  *  any further elliptic-curve operations from the wallet.
  */
 
+/** This struct serves as an input parameter for passing the silent payment
+ *  address data.
+ *
+ *  The index field is for when more than one address is being sent to in
+ *  a transaction. Index is set based on the original ordering of the addresses
+ *  and used to return the generated outputs matching the original ordering.
+ *  When more than one recipient is used, the recipient array will be sorted in
+ *  place as part of generating the outputs, but the generated outputs will be
+ *  returned in the original ordering specified by the index to ensure the
+ *  caller is able to match up the generated outputs to the correct silent
+ *  payment address (e.g., to be able to assign the correct amounts to the
+ *  correct generated outputs in the final transaction).
+ */
+typedef struct {
+    secp256k1_pubkey scan_pubkey;
+    secp256k1_pubkey spend_pubkey;
+    size_t index;
+} secp256k1_silentpayments_recipient;
+
+/** Create Silent Payment outputs for recipient(s).
+ *
+ *  Given a list of n secret keys a_1...a_n (one for each silent payment
+ *  eligible input to spend), a serialized outpoint, and a list of recipients,
+ *  create the taproot outputs.
+ *
+ *  `outpoint_smallest` refers to the smallest outpoint lexicographically
+ *  from the transaction inputs (both silent payments eligible and non-eligible
+ *  inputs). This value MUST be the smallest outpoint out of all of the
+ *  transaction inputs, otherwise the recipient will be unable to find the
+ *  payment. Determining the smallest outpoint from the list of transaction
+ *  inputs is the responsibility of the caller. It is strongly recommended
+ *  that implementations ensure they are doing this correctly by using the
+ *  test vectors from BIP352.
+ *
+ *  If necessary, the secret keys are negated to enforce the right y-parity.
+ *  For that reason, the secret keys have to be passed in via two different
+ *  parameter pairs, depending on whether the seckeys correspond to x-only
+ *  outputs or not.
+ *
+ *  Returns: 1 if creation of outputs was successful. 0 if an error occured.
+ *  Args:                ctx: pointer to a context object
+ *  Out:   generated_outputs: pointer to an array of pointers to xonly pubkeys,
+ *                            one per recipient.
+ *                            The outputs here are sorted by the index value
+ *                            provided in the recipient objects.
+ *  In:           recipients: pointer to an array of pointers to silent payment
+ *                            recipients, where each recipient is a scan public
+ *                            key, a spend public key, and an index indicating
+ *                            its position in the original ordering. The
+ *                            recipient array will be sorted in place, but
+ *                            generated outputs are saved in the
+ *                            `generated_outputs` array to match the ordering
+ *                            from the index field. This ensures the caller is
+ *                            able to match the generated outputs to the
+ *                            correct silent payment addresses. The same
+ *                            recipient can be passed multiple times to create
+ *                            multiple outputs for the same recipient.
+ *              n_recipients: the number of recipients. This is equal to the
+ *                            total number of outputs to be generated as each
+ *                            recipient may passed multiple times to generate
+ *                            multiple outputs for the same recipient
+ *         outpoint_smallest: serialized (36-byte) smallest outpoint
+ *                            (lexicographically) from the transaction inputs
+ *           taproot_seckeys: pointer to an array of pointers to taproot
+ *                            keypair inputs (can be NULL if no secret keys
+ *                            of taproot inputs are used)
+ *         n_taproot_seckeys: the number of sender's taproot input secret keys
+ *             plain_seckeys: pointer to an array of pointers to 32-byte
+ *                            secret keys of non-taproot inputs (can be NULL
+ *                            if no secret keys of non-taproot inputs are
+ *                            used)
+ *           n_plain_seckeys: the number of sender's non-taproot input secret
+ *                            keys
+ */
+SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_silentpayments_sender_create_outputs(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_xonly_pubkey **generated_outputs,
+    const secp256k1_silentpayments_recipient **recipients,
+    size_t n_recipients,
+    const unsigned char *outpoint_smallest36,
+    const secp256k1_keypair * const *taproot_seckeys,
+    size_t n_taproot_seckeys,
+    const unsigned char * const *plain_seckeys,
+    size_t n_plain_seckeys
+) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif

src/modules/silentpayments/main_impl.h

@@ -7,10 +7,282 @@
 #define SECP256K1_MODULE_SILENTPAYMENTS_MAIN_H
 
 #include "../../../include/secp256k1.h"
+#include "../../../include/secp256k1_extrakeys.h"
 #include "../../../include/secp256k1_silentpayments.h"
 
-/* TODO: implement functions for sender side. */
+/** Sort an array of silent payment recipients. This is used to group recipients by scan pubkey to
+ *  ensure the correct values of k are used when creating multiple outputs for a recipient. */
+static int secp256k1_silentpayments_recipient_sort_cmp(const void* pk1, const void* pk2, void *ctx) {
+    return secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp((secp256k1_context *)ctx,
+        &(*(const secp256k1_silentpayments_recipient **)pk1)->scan_pubkey,
+        &(*(const secp256k1_silentpayments_recipient **)pk2)->scan_pubkey
+    );
+}
 
-/* TODO: implement functions for receiver side. */
+static void secp256k1_silentpayments_recipient_sort(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const secp256k1_silentpayments_recipient **recipients, size_t n_recipients) {
+
+    /* Suppress wrong warning (fixed in MSVC 19.33) */
+    #if defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER < 1933)
+    #pragma warning(push)
+    #pragma warning(disable: 4090)
+    #endif
+
+    secp256k1_hsort(recipients, n_recipients, sizeof(*recipients), secp256k1_silentpayments_recipient_sort_cmp, (void *)ctx);
+
+    #if defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER < 1933)
+    #pragma warning(pop)
+    #endif
+}
+
+/** Set hash state to the BIP340 tagged hash midstate for "BIP0352/Inputs". */
+static void secp256k1_silentpayments_sha256_init_inputs(secp256k1_sha256* hash) {
+    secp256k1_sha256_initialize(hash);
+    hash->s[0] = 0xd4143ffcul;
+    hash->s[1] = 0x012ea4b5ul;
+    hash->s[2] = 0x36e21c8ful;
+    hash->s[3] = 0xf7ec7b54ul;
+    hash->s[4] = 0x4dd4e2acul;
+    hash->s[5] = 0x9bcaa0a4ul;
+    hash->s[6] = 0xe244899bul;
+    hash->s[7] = 0xcd06903eul;
+
+    hash->bytes = 64;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_silentpayments_calculate_input_hash(unsigned char *input_hash, const unsigned char *outpoint_smallest36, secp256k1_ge *pubkey_sum) {
+    secp256k1_sha256 hash;
+    unsigned char pubkey_sum_ser[33];
+    size_t len;
+    int ret;
+
+    secp256k1_silentpayments_sha256_init_inputs(&hash);
+    secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash, outpoint_smallest36, 36);
+    ret = secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(pubkey_sum, pubkey_sum_ser, &len, 1);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(ret && len == sizeof(pubkey_sum_ser));
+    (void)ret;
+    secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash, pubkey_sum_ser, sizeof(pubkey_sum_ser));
+    secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hash, input_hash);
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_silentpayments_create_shared_secret(const secp256k1_context *ctx, unsigned char *shared_secret33, const secp256k1_scalar *secret_component, const secp256k1_ge *public_component) {
+    secp256k1_gej ss_j;
+    secp256k1_ge ss;
+    size_t len;
+    int ret;
+
+    /* Compute shared_secret = tweaked_secret_component * Public_component */
+    secp256k1_ecmult_const(&ss_j, public_component, secret_component);
+    secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&ss, &ss_j);
+    secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &ss, sizeof(ss));
+    /* This can only fail if the shared secret is the point at infinity, which should be
+     * impossible at this point, considering we have already validated the public key and
+     * the secret key being used
+     */
+    ret = secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_serialize(&ss, shared_secret33, &len, 1);
+    VERIFY_CHECK(ret && len == 33);
+    (void)ret;
+    /* While not technically "secret" data, explicitly clear the shared secret since leaking this would allow an attacker
+     * to identify the resulting transaction as a silent payments transaction and potentially link the transaction
+     * back to the silent payment address
+     */
+    secp256k1_ge_clear(&ss);
+    secp256k1_gej_clear(&ss_j);
+}
+
+/** Set hash state to the BIP340 tagged hash midstate for "BIP0352/SharedSecret". */
+static void secp256k1_silentpayments_sha256_init_sharedsecret(secp256k1_sha256* hash) {
+    secp256k1_sha256_initialize(hash);
+    hash->s[0] = 0x88831537ul;
+    hash->s[1] = 0x5127079bul;
+    hash->s[2] = 0x69c2137bul;
+    hash->s[3] = 0xab0303e6ul;
+    hash->s[4] = 0x98fa21faul;
+    hash->s[5] = 0x4a888523ul;
+    hash->s[6] = 0xbd99daabul;
+    hash->s[7] = 0xf25e5e0aul;
+
+    hash->bytes = 64;
+}
+
+static void secp256k1_silentpayments_create_t_k(secp256k1_scalar *t_k_scalar, const unsigned char *shared_secret33, unsigned int k) {
+    secp256k1_sha256 hash;
+    unsigned char hash_ser[32];
+    unsigned char k_serialized[4];
+
+    /* Compute t_k = hash(shared_secret || ser_32(k))  [sha256 with tag "BIP0352/SharedSecret"] */
+    secp256k1_silentpayments_sha256_init_sharedsecret(&hash);
+    secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash, shared_secret33, 33);
+    secp256k1_write_be32(k_serialized, k);
+    secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash, k_serialized, sizeof(k_serialized));
+    secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hash, hash_ser);
+    secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(t_k_scalar, hash_ser, NULL);
+    /* While not technically "secret" data, explicitly clear hash_ser since leaking this would allow an attacker
+     * to identify the resulting transaction as a silent payments transaction and potentially link the transaction
+     * back to the silent payment address
+     */
+    memset(hash_ser, 0, sizeof(hash_ser));
+}
+
+static int secp256k1_silentpayments_create_output_pubkey(const secp256k1_context *ctx, secp256k1_xonly_pubkey *P_output_xonly, const unsigned char *shared_secret33, const secp256k1_pubkey *recipient_spend_pubkey, unsigned int k) {
+    secp256k1_ge P_output_ge;
+    secp256k1_scalar t_k_scalar;
+    int ret;
+
+    /* Calculate and return P_output_xonly = B_spend + t_k * G
+     * This will fail if B_spend is the point at infinity or if
+     * B_spend + t_k*G is the point at infinity.
+     */
+    secp256k1_silentpayments_create_t_k(&t_k_scalar, shared_secret33, k);
+    if (!secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &P_output_ge, recipient_spend_pubkey)) {
+        secp256k1_scalar_clear(&t_k_scalar);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ret = secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(&P_output_ge, &t_k_scalar);
+    /* tweak add only fails if t_k_scalar is equal to the dlog of P_output_ge, but t_k_scalar is the output of a collision resistant hash function. */
+    /* TODO: consider declassify ret */
+    /* TODO: but we don't want to imply this can never happen */
+    VERIFY_CHECK(ret);
+#ifndef VERIFY
+    (void) ret;
+#endif
+    secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_save(P_output_xonly, &P_output_ge);
+
+    /* While not technically "secret" data, explicitly clear t_k since leaking this would allow an attacker
+     * to identify the resulting transaction as a silent payments transaction and potentially link the transaction
+     * back to the silent payment address
+     */
+    secp256k1_scalar_clear(&t_k_scalar);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int secp256k1_silentpayments_sender_create_outputs(
+    const secp256k1_context *ctx,
+    secp256k1_xonly_pubkey **generated_outputs,
+    const secp256k1_silentpayments_recipient **recipients,
+    size_t n_recipients,
+    const unsigned char *outpoint_smallest36,
+    const secp256k1_keypair * const *taproot_seckeys,
+    size_t n_taproot_seckeys,
+    const unsigned char * const *plain_seckeys,
+    size_t n_plain_seckeys
+) {
+    size_t i, k;
+    secp256k1_scalar a_sum_scalar, addend, input_hash_scalar;
+    secp256k1_ge A_sum_ge;
+    secp256k1_gej A_sum_gej;
+    unsigned char input_hash[32];
+    unsigned char shared_secret[33];
+    secp256k1_silentpayments_recipient last_recipient;
+    int overflow = 0;
+    int ret;
+
+    /* Sanity check inputs. */
+    VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
+    ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx));
+    ARG_CHECK(generated_outputs != NULL);
+    ARG_CHECK(recipients != NULL);
+    ARG_CHECK(n_recipients > 0);
+    ARG_CHECK((plain_seckeys != NULL) || (taproot_seckeys != NULL));
+    if (taproot_seckeys != NULL) {
+        ARG_CHECK(n_taproot_seckeys > 0);
+    } else {
+        ARG_CHECK(n_taproot_seckeys == 0);
+    }
+    if (plain_seckeys != NULL) {
+        ARG_CHECK(n_plain_seckeys > 0);
+    } else {
+        ARG_CHECK(n_plain_seckeys == 0);
+    }
+    ARG_CHECK(outpoint_smallest36 != NULL);
+    /* ensure the index field is set correctly */
+    for (i = 0; i < n_recipients; i++) {
+        ARG_CHECK(recipients[i]->index == i);
+    }
+
+    /* Compute input private keys sum: a_sum = a_1 + a_2 + ... + a_n */
+    a_sum_scalar = secp256k1_scalar_zero;
+    for (i = 0; i < n_plain_seckeys; i++) {
+        ret = secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(&addend, plain_seckeys[i]);
+        /* TODO: We can declassify return value, because scalar set only fails if the seckey is invalid */
+        secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &ret, sizeof(ret));
+        if (!ret) {
+            /* TODO: clear a_sum_scalar */
+            return 0;
+        }
+        secp256k1_scalar_add(&a_sum_scalar, &a_sum_scalar, &addend);
+    }
+    /* private keys used for taproot outputs have to be negated if they resulted in an odd point */
+    for (i = 0; i < n_taproot_seckeys; i++) {
+        secp256k1_ge addend_point;
+        ret = secp256k1_keypair_load(ctx, &addend, &addend_point, taproot_seckeys[i]);
+        /* TODO: we can declassify return value */
+        if (!ret) {
+            /* TODO: clear a_sum_scalar */
+            return 0;
+        }
+        secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &ret, sizeof(ret));
+        if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&addend_point.y)) {
+            secp256k1_scalar_negate(&addend, &addend);
+        }
+        secp256k1_scalar_add(&a_sum_scalar, &a_sum_scalar, &addend);
+    }
+    /* If there are any failures in loading/summing up the secret keys, fail early */
+    /* TODO: can we declassify this? */
+    /* Yes: We assume the adversary has access to a_sum_scalar*G */
+    ret = secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&a_sum_scalar);
+    secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &ret, sizeof(ret));
+    if (ret) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Compute input_hash = hash(outpoint_L || (a_sum * G)) */
+    secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &A_sum_gej, &a_sum_scalar);
+    secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&A_sum_ge, &A_sum_gej);
+    /* TODO: comment */
+    secp256k1_declassify(ctx, &A_sum_ge, sizeof(A_sum_ge));
+
+    /* Calculate the input hash and tweak a_sum, i.e., a_sum_tweaked = a_sum * input_hash */
+    secp256k1_silentpayments_calculate_input_hash(input_hash, outpoint_smallest36, &A_sum_ge);
+    secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&input_hash_scalar, input_hash, &overflow);
+    /* TODO: consider VERIFY_CHECK ??? */
+    if (overflow) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    secp256k1_scalar_mul(&a_sum_scalar, &a_sum_scalar, &input_hash_scalar);
+    secp256k1_silentpayments_recipient_sort(ctx, recipients, n_recipients);
+    last_recipient = *recipients[0];
+    k = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < n_recipients; i++) {
+        if ((i == 0) || (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp(ctx, &last_recipient.scan_pubkey, &recipients[i]->scan_pubkey) != 0)) {
+            /* If we are on a different scan pubkey, its time to recreate the the shared secret and reset k to 0.
+             * It's very unlikely the scan public key is invalid by this point, since this means the caller would
+             * have created the _silentpayments_recipient object incorrectly, but just to be sure we still check that
+             * the public key is valid.
+             */
+            secp256k1_ge pk;
+            if (!secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, &recipients[i]->scan_pubkey)) {
+                /* TODO: clean up */
+                return 0;
+            }
+            secp256k1_silentpayments_create_shared_secret(ctx, shared_secret, &a_sum_scalar, &pk);
+            k = 0;
+        }
+        if (!secp256k1_silentpayments_create_output_pubkey(ctx, generated_outputs[recipients[i]->index], shared_secret, &recipients[i]->spend_pubkey, k)) {
+            /* TODO: clean up */
+            return 0;
+        }
+        k++;
+        last_recipient = *recipients[i];
+    }
+    /* Explicitly clear variables containing secret data */
+    secp256k1_scalar_clear(&addend);
+    secp256k1_scalar_clear(&a_sum_scalar);
+
+    /* While technically not "secret data," explicitly clear the shared secret since leaking this
+     * could result in a third party being able to identify the transaction as a silent payments transaction
+     * and potentially link the transaction back to a silent payment address
+     */
+    memset(&shared_secret, 0, sizeof(shared_secret));
+    return 1;
+}
 
 #endif