Merge tag 'asoc-fix-v6.5-rc4' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus

ASoC: Fix for v6.5

Not really a fix, but rather a licensing update for the fsl_micfil
driver.

Author: tiwai

.mailmap

@@ -60,3 +60,14 @@ Description:	Module taint flags:
 			C   staging driver module
 			E   unsigned module
 			==  =====================
+
+What:		/sys/module/grant_table/parameters/free_per_iteration
+Date:		July 2023
+KernelVersion:	6.5 but backported to all supported stable branches
+Contact:	Xen developer discussion <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
+Description:	Read and write number of grant entries to attempt to free per iteration.
+
+		Note: Future versions of Xen and Linux may provide a better
+		interface for controlling the rate of deferred grant reclaim
+		or may not need it at all.
+Users:		Qubes OS (https://www.qubes-os.org)

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-module

@@ -2691,7 +2691,7 @@
 		 45 = /dev/ttyMM1		Marvell MPSC - port 1 (obsolete unused)
 		 46 = /dev/ttyCPM0		PPC CPM (SCC or SMC) - port 0
 		    ...
-		 47 = /dev/ttyCPM5		PPC CPM (SCC or SMC) - port 5
+		 49 = /dev/ttyCPM5		PPC CPM (SCC or SMC) - port 3
 		 50 = /dev/ttyIOC0		Altix serial card
 		    ...
 		 81 = /dev/ttyIOC31		Altix serial card

Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt

@@ -484,11 +484,14 @@ Spectre variant 2
 
    Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at
    boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against
-   Spectre v2 variant attacks, including cross-thread branch target injections
-   on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, eIBRS enables STIBP too.
+   Spectre v2 variant attacks.
 
-   Legacy IBRS systems clear the IBRS bit on exit to userspace and
-   therefore explicitly enable STIBP for that
+   On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target
+   injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables
+   STIBP, too.
+
+   AMD Automatic IBRS does not protect userspace, and Legacy IBRS systems clear
+   the IBRS bit on exit to userspace, therefore both explicitly enable STIBP.
 
    The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
    CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ stable kernels.
 | ARM            | MMU-700         | #2268618,2812531| N/A                         |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| ARM            | GIC-700         | #2941627        | ARM64_ERRATUM_2941627       |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | Broadcom       | Brahma-B53      | N/A             | ARM64_ERRATUM_845719        |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | Broadcom       | Brahma-B53      | N/A             | ARM64_ERRATUM_843419        |

Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst

@@ -84,8 +84,6 @@ nr_inodes  The maximum number of inodes for this instance. The default
            is half of the number of your physical RAM pages, or (on a
            machine with highmem) the number of lowmem RAM pages,
            whichever is the lower.
-noswap     Disables swap. Remounts must respect the original settings.
-           By default swap is enabled.
 =========  ============================================================
 
 These parameters accept a suffix k, m or g for kilo, mega and giga and
@@ -99,36 +97,31 @@ mount with such options, since it allows any user with write access to
 use up all the memory on the machine; but enhances the scalability of
 that instance in a system with many CPUs making intensive use of it.
 
+tmpfs blocks may be swapped out, when there is a shortage of memory.
+tmpfs has a mount option to disable its use of swap:
+
+======  ===========================================================
+noswap  Disables swap. Remounts must respect the original settings.
+        By default swap is enabled.
+======  ===========================================================
+
 tmpfs also supports Transparent Huge Pages which requires a kernel
 configured with CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE and with huge supported for
 your system (has_transparent_hugepage(), which is architecture specific).
 The mount options for this are:
 
-======  ============================================================
-huge=0  never: disables huge pages for the mount
-huge=1  always: enables huge pages for the mount
-huge=2  within_size: only allocate huge pages if the page will be
-        fully within i_size, also respect fadvise()/madvise() hints.
-huge=3  advise: only allocate huge pages if requested with
-        fadvise()/madvise()
-======  ============================================================
-
-There is a sysfs file which you can also use to control system wide THP
-configuration for all tmpfs mounts, the file is:
-
-/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled
-
-This sysfs file is placed on top of THP sysfs directory and so is registered
-by THP code. It is however only used to control all tmpfs mounts with one
-single knob. Since it controls all tmpfs mounts it should only be used either
-for emergency or testing purposes. The values you can set for shmem_enabled are:
-
-==  ============================================================
--1  deny: disables huge on shm_mnt and all mounts, for
-    emergency use
--2  force: enables huge on shm_mnt and all mounts, w/o needing
-    option, for testing
-==  ============================================================
+================ ==============================================================
+huge=never       Do not allocate huge pages.  This is the default.
+huge=always      Attempt to allocate huge page every time a new page is needed.
+huge=within_size Only allocate huge page if it will be fully within i_size.
+                 Also respect madvise(2) hints.
+huge=advise      Only allocate huge page if requested with madvise(2).
+================ ==============================================================
+
+See also Documentation/admin-guide/mm/transhuge.rst, which describes the
+sysfs file /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled: which can
+be used to deny huge pages on all tmpfs mounts in an emergency, or to
+force huge pages on all tmpfs mounts for testing.
 
 tmpfs has a mount option to set the NUMA memory allocation policy for
 all files in that instance (if CONFIG_NUMA is enabled) - which can be

Documentation/filesystems/tmpfs.rst

@@ -65,15 +65,16 @@ argument - drivers can process completions for any number of Tx
 packets but should only process up to ``budget`` number of
 Rx packets. Rx processing is usually much more expensive.
 
-In other words, it is recommended to ignore the budget argument when
-performing TX buffer reclamation to ensure that the reclamation is not
-arbitrarily bounded; however, it is required to honor the budget argument
-for RX processing.
+In other words for Rx processing the ``budget`` argument limits how many
+packets driver can process in a single poll. Rx specific APIs like page
+pool or XDP cannot be used at all when ``budget`` is 0.
+skb Tx processing should happen regardless of the ``budget``, but if
+the argument is 0 driver cannot call any XDP (or page pool) APIs.
 
 .. warning::
 
-   The ``budget`` argument may be 0 if core tries to only process Tx completions
-   and no Rx packets.
+   The ``budget`` argument may be 0 if core tries to only process
+   skb Tx completions and no Rx or XDP packets.
 
 The poll method returns the amount of work done. If the driver still
 has outstanding work to do (e.g. ``budget`` was exhausted)

Documentation/networking/napi.rst

@@ -254,7 +254,6 @@ an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list:
   Samsung	Javier González <javier.gonz@samsung.com>
 
   Microsoft	James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
-  VMware
   Xen		Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
 
   Canonical	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
@@ -263,10 +262,8 @@ an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list:
   Red Hat	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
   SUSE		Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
 
-  Amazon
   Google	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
 
-  GCC
   LLVM		Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
   ============= ========================================================
 

Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst

@@ -63,31 +63,28 @@ information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
 of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
 lifted, in perpetuity.
 
-Coordination
-------------
-
-Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
-escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
-<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
-are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
-upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
-will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
-publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
-the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
-include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
-the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
-<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
+Coordination with other groups
+------------------------------
+
+The kernel security team strongly recommends that reporters of potential
+security issues NEVER contact the "linux-distros" mailing list until
+AFTER discussing it with the kernel security team.  Do not Cc: both
+lists at once.  You may contact the linux-distros mailing list after a
+fix has been agreed on and you fully understand the requirements that
+doing so will impose on you and the kernel community.
+
+The different lists have different goals and the linux-distros rules do
+not contribute to actually fixing any potential security problems.
 
 CVE assignment
 --------------
 
-The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them
-for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and
-may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
-assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
-linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
-before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
-message if the reporter agrees.
+The security team does not assign CVEs, nor do we require them for
+reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and may
+delay the bug handling.  If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
+assigned, they should find one by themselves, for example by contacting
+MITRE directly.  However under no circumstances will a patch inclusion
+be delayed to wait for a CVE identifier to arrive.
 
 Non-disclosure agreements
 -------------------------

Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst

@@ -4463,7 +4463,6 @@ CADENCE USB3 DRD IP DRIVER
 M:	Peter Chen <peter.chen@kernel.org>
 M:	Pawel Laszczak <pawell@cadence.com>
 R:	Roger Quadros <rogerq@kernel.org>
-R:	Aswath Govindraju <a-govindraju@ti.com>
 L:	linux-usb@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Maintained
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/peter.chen/usb.git
@@ -5149,10 +5148,12 @@ S:	Maintained
 F:	include/linux/compiler_attributes.h
 
 COMPUTE EXPRESS LINK (CXL)
+M:	Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
+M:	Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
+M:	Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
 M:	Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
 M:	Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
 M:	Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
-M:	Ben Widawsky <bwidawsk@kernel.org>
 M:	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
 L:	linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Maintained
@@ -21641,11 +21642,17 @@ F:	Documentation/translations/zh_TW/
 TTY LAYER
 M:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
 M:	Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
+L:	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
+L:	linux-serial@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Supported
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty.git
 F:	Documentation/driver-api/serial/
 F:	drivers/tty/
+F:	drivers/tty/serial/serial_base.h
+F:	drivers/tty/serial/serial_base_bus.c
 F:	drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c
+F:	drivers/tty/serial/serial_ctrl.c
+F:	drivers/tty/serial/serial_port.c
 F:	include/linux/selection.h
 F:	include/linux/serial.h
 F:	include/linux/serial_core.h