You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: lectures/exchangeable.md
+10-10Lines changed: 10 additions & 10 deletions
Original file line number
Diff line number
Diff line change
@@ -141,10 +141,10 @@ which states that the **conditional density** on the left side does not equal th
141
141
But in the special IID case,
142
142
143
143
$$
144
-
p(W_t | W_{t-1}, \ldots, W_0) = p(W_t)
144
+
p(W_t | W_{t-1}, \ldots, W_0) = p(W_t) ,
145
145
$$
146
146
147
-
and partial history $W_{t-1}, \ldots, W_0$ contains no information about the probability of $W_t$.
147
+
so that the partial history $W_{t-1}, \ldots, W_0$ contains no information about the probability of $W_t$.
148
148
149
149
So in the IID case, there is **nothing to learn** about the densities of future random variables from past random variables.
150
150
@@ -176,13 +176,13 @@ $G$.
176
176
We could say that *objectively*, meaning *after* nature has chosen either $F$ or $G$, the probability that the data are generated as draws from $F$ is either $0$
177
177
or $1$.
178
178
179
-
We now drop into this setting a partially informed decision maker who knows
179
+
We now drop into this setting a partially informed decision maker who
180
180
181
-
- both $F$ and $G$, but
181
+
-knows both $F$ and $G$, but
182
182
183
-
- not the $F$ or $G$ that nature drew once-and-for-all at $t = -1$
183
+
-does not know whether at $t = -1$ nature had drawn $F$ or whether nature had drawn $G$ once-and-for-all
184
184
185
-
So our decision maker does not know which of the two distributions nature selected.
185
+
Thus, although our decision maker knows $F$ and knows $G$, he does not know which of these two known distributions nature had selected to draw from.
186
186
187
187
The decision maker describes his ignorance with a **subjective probability**
188
188
$\tilde \pi$ and reasons as if nature had selected $F$ with probability
@@ -259,12 +259,11 @@ This means that random variable $W_0$ contains information about random variab
259
259
260
260
So there is something to learn from the past about the future.
261
261
262
-
But what and how?
263
262
264
263
## Exchangeability
265
264
266
265
While the sequence $W_0, W_1, \ldots$ is not IID, it can be verified that it is
267
-
**exchangeable**, which means that the ``re-ordered'' joint distributions $h(W_0, W_1)$ and $h(W_1, W_0)$
266
+
**exchangeable**, which means that the joint distributions $h(W_0, W_1)$ and $h(W_1, W_0)$ of the ''re-ordered'' sequences
268
267
satisfy
269
268
270
269
$$
@@ -280,13 +279,14 @@ appear are altered.
280
279
Equation {eq}`eq_definetti` represents our instance of an exchangeable joint density over a sequence of random
281
280
variables as a **mixture** of two IID joint densities over a sequence of random variables.
282
281
283
-
For a Bayesian statistician, the mixing parameter $\tilde \pi \in (0,1)$ has a special interpretation
284
-
as a subjective **prior probability** that nature selected probability distribution $F$.
282
+
A Bayesian statistician interprets the mixing parameter $\tilde \pi \in (0,1)$ as a decision maker's subjective belief -- the decision maker's **prior probability** -- that nature had selected probability distribution $F$.
285
283
284
+
```{note}
286
285
DeFinetti {cite}`definetti` established a related representation of an exchangeable process created by mixing
287
286
sequences of IID Bernoulli random variables with parameter $\theta \in (0,1)$ and mixing probability density $\pi(\theta)$
288
287
that a Bayesian statistician would interpret as a prior over the unknown
0 commit comments