Replies: 15 comments 51 replies
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In other words, if I want to submit one solution per epoch and earn around 60 Aleo per solution, I need to stake at least 100,000 Aleo. But if my computing power isn’t strong enough, and I want to avoid accidentally submitting multiple solutions in the same epoch — which I’ve seen happen, where many epochs are skipped and then suddenly two or three are submitted in one — then I would need to stake at least 300,000 Aleo to be safe. With 300,000 Aleo staked, I could produce roughly 4,200 Aleo per day. Assuming I charge a 2% fee, that means I’m staking 300,000 credits just to earn about 80 Aleo a day. That’s insane. |
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howardwu, clearly u do not understand the impact of this ARC on miners economics, the entire Aleo miner community will go against this. We have to stop this insane things. Approved by and you and other 40 users (!!!! 40 !!!!!!!! only think that 40 people are killing our economics and future its frustrating). |
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@MarioMoreschini Please keep the discourse civilized and respectful. I will have to ask the moderators to block you if we can't maintain respectful conversation -- including disliking everything I post. I would like to clarify a few key points you have raised here:
As a contributor to Aleo, my focus & priority with ARC-0046 is to improve the health of the Aleo network as a whole and to give provers a voice in consensus by improving their own representation in consensus. |
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@howardwu, thanks for having me blocked from reply to any post. Thats a good example of democracy, not really hard to make another account - isnt it? Having disliking your post at least got the results that finally you have showed up in the group. If we are done with this, lets move to more important things. so, from the economic point of view its a disaster. We have entered the Aleo mining and the project with a clear business case based on the profit we can make (holding, staking or selling) based on different strategy of the miners - this ARC46 is changing the rules of the game.
Nobody is questioning your technical expertise, we need to add just the economic feasibility of it and take into account also our view - if you are sure the ARC46 its solid you can submit again for voting, just now we are aware of it. Hope this was enough clear and explanatory |
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@howardwu Hello, I will be speaking from my POV as someone who was interested in getting into ALEO mining, my goal was to run an IceRiver AE3 for approximately 600MH/s. in 2 years, hashrate of ASICs will be higher, as power consumption, and this network will be one of the most expensive with the biggest step to entry, will necessitate tens of thousands of dollars in token just to run a miner you already buy thousands of dollars... This will centralize even more the mining and the hashrate, in a network with already almost only 2 huge pools. It really honestly seems like locking miners tokens so VC's can sell all they want, and when I see that some VCs are still x10 or way more from their initial investment after a -93% on the coin, I feel like it will no stop, feeding VCs by reducing miners right in your ecosystem. I'm feeling a lack of transparency and a governance that seems biaised, i cannot believe not a single person would've said no to this proposal if all the miners had voted... Business plan for becoming a prover is now not the same, and miners aren't just miners anymore. Of course all this is just my thinking on ARC-0046, but I thin a change of this matter should not be voted by only 40 people, it shows one more time that governance in web3 i often more dream than real decentralization I guess... Respectfully |
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I would like to ask, For now I am participating in mining in a mining pool, will the mining pool provide the Aleo tokens for staking? I am just a participating miner, do I still need to provide Aleo staking? Thanks. |
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@ckalmighty thank you for sharing. Indeed the page mentions 29.3 days, close to "30 days of Aleo production" . However, if I understand correctly, that is a custodial amount, you can just exit and withdraw your funds at some predetermined period. It's not clear on whether you're eligible for staking rewards over that custodied amount, which, depending on operating costs, could be the fair thing to do for a pool, perhaps minus some fee. As for whether 29.3 days is a good number: the pool seems to be playing it very "safe" by using maximum solutions per round as a benchmark. Perhaps it could make more sense to use historic average solutions per round, and maybe you can argue with them to lower the amount a bit. |
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What doesn't make sense is I already have almost double their requirement natively staked on the block chain (earning rewards, per the specifications of ALEO), yet WhalePool doesn't take that into consideration. Instead they are holding my tokens captive which I could be staking myself natively. Also, if I stop mining with WhalePool there is no guidance as far as how I am to claim those tokens. This is where the Network would need to govern what the right way is for the pools to operate. |
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As noted here: #97 (reply in thread) There are possibilities for mining pools to leverage liquid staking, either implemented natively in the protocol or via a Leo program - similar to pondo.xyz . We'll try to work on an example Leo program for the community. |
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If Pool Operators leveraged the network's built in staking mechanisms to determine mining eligibility, that would solve a whole host of problems, including what @onyx99 has brought up in terms of potential legal issues, as well as miners' concerns about a pool operator just closing up shop and taking all of the staked tokens, as well as miners are now not only investing in the network's security, but also receiving rewards for it. I feel this approach is a win all around and it will also satisfy the ARC-0046 requirement that miners must now stake as well. Are there any downsides to this approach? |
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I would like to ask about this upgrade. I noticed the upgrade on July 31 mentioned in the code. If I stake now, what method should I use to stake? |
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All information is currently available in this ARC only, we will add official documentation once it went live. |
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@zklim Is there an estimated launch time for this? |
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ARC-0046 will activate on 7/31/2025 at 11:59:59 UTC. All stakers will earn staking rewards for their staked tokens as usual. In addition, they will now be allowed to submit puzzle solutions based on the amount they have staked (see table in the proposal). To stake, follow the normal staking procedure of calling |
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I want to know how often the current network expects a block and how often it expects a solution to be submitted. I looked at the constants in the code, but they don’t match the actual network behavior. |
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Does this guide take into consideration the fact that small miners go through a pool and our prover addresses are obfuscated by them? Does this mean small miners now have to run their own pool in order to continue mining? There hasn't been any guidance for small miners on how they will be able to continue to operate. Please advise. |
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I have two questions: For the coins that delegators stake to validators, can they be unstaked in about 1 hour and then freely traded or transferred? |
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Yes, they follow the same staking rules that apply to all other stakers. There are no special rules applied to provers who stake. The goal is to encourage provers to become stakers and support the network alongside their own personal incentives here. |
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If this is the goal, how is the 33% staking goal shared by validators and provers percentage wise? like a 50 50 split or something else? |
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If the provers themselves don't maintain at least 33% of the total stake, there is no reason that validators couldn't remove the puzzle (which is already a massive dilutive effect on validators). In fact, today, validators can immediately remove the puzzle and provers currently do not have enough stake to prevent it from happening. It is time to improve the health of the provers in the ecosystem. If provers don't go to the gym and start training, they will get beat up by everyone else in the ecosystem. |
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It is also worth mentioning that only a small percentage of your staking rewards go to validators, see the |
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If provers are expected to do everything validators are doing now, then shouldn't the reward for provers and validators be adjusted accordingly too? |
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The validators currently have too much power in the system. Namely, they can technically fork out the puzzle with no technical repercussions today. As such, ARC-0046 is intended to help provers grow in stake weight (with a goal for at least 33%) to protect their own interests in consensus. If the provers can protect their own interest, it increases the odds that provers can also propose to change the reward distribution to favor provers moreso. Today, the lack of power by provers is a serious issue for ALL provers. |
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"help provers grow in stake weight (with a goal for at least 33%)" - however at Q8+ there is a huge barrier to market entry for a new miner that wants to start in with ALEO. Any financial bar and check would prevent spam accounts flooding the network - so why not run with number 1/10 of your chosen values? |
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Hi, sorry if this question has already been asked, but I'm new to the ALEO network and I'm trying to get a handle on things. If a home miner that has, for instance, only a single IceRiver AE0 miner rated at 60MH/s is mining and earning an estimated 10 ALEO per day from that miner, it seems to me that it would take them about 10,000 days in order to hit the minimum staking requirement. If that's the case, they wouldn't have had enough time in order to earn that minimum amount and would now have to stop mining, rendering their AE0 miner useless, is that correct or is there a way for them to join a pool of stakers (much like joining a pool for mining) in order to continue home mining? Thank you for helping me to understand. |
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As mentioned in the other threads, there are mining pools, which can freely compete for hashpower. However, thank you for sharing the first concrete alternative proposal! It will require a lot of thought to get right. One way to implement this, is by allowing miners who stake to reference a "pool index". Whenever a solution comes in from any of the miners referencing a particular pool index, their combined stake is used as allowance. This would effectively enable a fully decentralized mining pool. But because of that it is also susceptible to attacks. For example, a powerful miner can strategically reference indices to land more of their own solutions, at the expense of less powerful miners. An alternative idea is to allow miners to delegate stake to a validator as well as a mining pool address. This way, mining pools can trustlessly validate that you're "staking your fair share". It is a kind of delegated staking. This is closer to the situation today, and might be an easier first step. Would this be of use? It would be nice to get some kind of feedback from mining pools whether this is useful. |
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Another challenge with the above ideas, is that they will require careful analysis so as to be compatible with existing liquid staking pools like Pondo. |
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Hello, I would like to critically address the staking protocol proposed in ARC-0046 for Puzzle Solution Submissions on the Aleo Network. After reviewing the proposal and the community discussions, I have several major concerns that I believe are insufficiently considered and that may negatively impact the network’s decentralization, fairness, and miner sustainability. Firstly, the staking requirements start at 100,000 ALEO per solution per epoch and increase stepwise to 2.5 million ALEO within two years. As one community member points out: “If I want to submit one solution per epoch and earn around 60 Aleo per solution, I need to stake at least 100,000 Aleo. But if my computing power isn’t strong enough, and I want to avoid accidentally submitting multiple solutions in the same epoch, I would need to stake at least 300,000 Aleo to be safe. With 300,000 Aleo staked, I could produce roughly 4,200 Aleo per day… That’s insane.” This makes it effectively impossible for small or home miners to participate meaningfully without either holding huge amounts of tokens upfront or joining large pools. The proposal itself admits that currently about 16 pools receive close to 90% of puzzle rewards, which this mechanism will likely exacerbate: “This cryptoeconomic mechanism ensures that proving pools are incentive aligned with the network and moreso with the health of the network by aligning their behavior.” Secondly, the pooling and delegation dynamics are not transparent or regulated. The protocol states that it is “up to the pools to decide how they would like to share the responsibility of staking.” This opens the door to unfair reward distributions and centralization, where miners who contribute less capital but pool computing power are dependent on opaque pool governance. Small miners may end up subsidizing whales. Thirdly, the protocol introduces significant capital lockup risks. Staking requirements increase every quarter for two years, but exit requirements are explicitly “out of scope.” Miners may be forced to lock massive amounts of ALEO for long periods, reducing liquidity and increasing their financial risk, especially if the token’s price fluctuates. This creates a barrier to entry and exit that contradicts the principles of a fair and accessible network. Fourthly, the proposal aims for provers to stake at least 33% of the total token supply to prevent validators from removing the puzzle mechanism, thereby preserving their influence. While security is important, this means provers must compete financially with validators, adding complexity and further concentrating power: “If provers themselves don't maintain at least 33% of the total stake, validators could remove the puzzle.” This risks creating a two-tier system where only wealthy participants can meaningfully secure the network and earn rewards. Finally, the economic incentives seem misaligned with small miners’ realities. The requirement to stake large sums for relatively small daily earnings makes home mining uneconomical, pushing users toward centralized pools. The lack of clear, enforced fairness measures for pools aggravates this. In conclusion, while the goal of aligning prover incentives with network security is valid, this ARC risks increasing centralization, raising barriers for small miners, creating capital lockups, and transferring disproportionate power to whales and pools. It neglects the practical realities and financial limitations of smaller participants and could harm network health in the long term. I urge the community and developers to reconsider this approach, possibly by:
In my opinion only with a more balanced and inclusive design can Aleo maintain decentralization, fairness, and healthy growth. Kind regards. |
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Onyx hello, we - as Aleo mining community - are in line with you. we need support to pull out arc46 and vote against the limit. can u help us? we are miners and not really tech experts. |
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Hi, If you want some help, please visit t.me/aleominers |
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I understand not wanting miners to mine tokens to just sell them, but I don't think the computational power of the smaller miners was considered in this decision. What you will effectively do is drive away all of the small guys and now only a few large mining operations will do all of the mining, effectively centralizing ALEO. I thought the goal was to DEcentralize? In order to do that, wouldn't you want lots of smaller miners to protect against a 51% attack? Having such a high requirement of staking creates a barrier of entry for smaller miners and goes against decentralization. I believe that onyx99 said it best. ARC-0046 will centralize ALEO and eject all small miners out of the network. |
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At the moment, I have the same question. I have just reached out to the Aleo Network Foundation to ask for clarification on whether this is a typo or bug. For the record, I have no affiliation to the Aleo Network Foundation, which truly operates independently from Provable. In addition, I did not participate in this community vote, given this ARC proposal originated from me. |
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Thank you for looking into that. |
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To clarify regarding 153 votes and 40 unique voters, there are different voting powers for each of the roles that are able to participate in the voting process. |
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Good Morning @howardwu, I had just found out in the ALEO discord from "Eugene | Community Team" that voting is only done by Validators. This means that a vote that affected miners took place where the miners were unable to represent themselves. I don't think it's fair that decisions are made about how miners are to operate without miners' input or say. I can't help but to draw a parallel conclusion to the American Revolutionary War and one of the reasons why the United States was formed ("No Taxation without Representation" being a popular slogan at that time). You had said, "for which all provers could participate" but I have learned that this isn't true at all. We, as provers have absolutely NO WAY to stop this proposal and that just isn't right. There is obviously a lot of disagreement with this proposal between those that proposed/voted on it and those that it actually affects who were unable to participate in the vote. We need to come to a resolution on this that is fair for all, including those that were not represented in the vote. Screenshot provided as my source: |
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"All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others." |
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If were were to stay on the game how do we stake and track our coins? The leo wallet does not offer steaking |
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You can track the stake of all validators on the Provable Explorer: https://explorer.provable.com/validators In addition, you can check how many tokens your account has staked by entering your account address in the Search Bar on the Provable Explorer home page: https://explorer.provable.com/ |
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Dear Aleo Labs Team, With some regulatory experience, I would like to raise a significant legal concern regarding ARC-0046, particularly for users within the EU and potentially beyond. MiCA Regulation and Custodial Services If a mining pool requires users to lock ALEO tokens to participate in puzzle submissions, this activity may legally constitute custodial activity. Pools operating without proper registration may be non-compliant, exposing EU users to the risk of unintentionally engaging in illegal activity. User Location Determines Applicability Aleo Labs’ Involvement with Pools Similar Global Regulatory Frameworks Non-Custodial Options and Legal Risks Request Thank you for your attention to this important matter. Kind regards. |
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I want to clarify a point regarding the role of provers, because it seems there is some confusion or a mixing of fundamentally different concepts. At no point did I say that provers are responsible for creating, validating, or storing transactions on-chain. I fully agree those responsibilities lie exclusively with the consensus validators (Proof-of-Stake nodes in AleoBFT). However, as i tried to explain provers play a critical and indispensable role off-chain by generating zero-knowledge proofs. These proofs validate that private transactions and computations are executed correctly without revealing any sensitive data. This off-chain proving is absolutely fundamental to Aleo’s privacy guarantees and overall network security, and may not be underestimated. Therefore, while provers do not participate in consensus or on-chain transaction validation, dismissing their importance misses the point that without valid proofs from provers, the network simply cannot operate as intended today. Furthermore, from a regulatory standpoint under the EU’s MiCA framework, any entity that manages or controls crypto assets on behalf of users such as requiring users to lock tokens in custodial proving pools may be classified as a custodial crypto asset service provider (CASP). This exposes operators and users, especially within the EU, to serious legal risks. I hope this clears up the distinction and underscores why provers contribute critically to Aleo’s decentralization and security on a layer distinct from consensus and why these regulatory concerns must be taken seriously. Kind regards. |
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This sounds like a misunderstanding to me. Today, validators can delete every prover from the network (& the provers can do nothing to stop it), and the network will continue to be decentralized and users would still be able to generate transactions that validate on the ledger. Provers today do not contribute to network security -- ARC-0046 changes this. Pools today already custody tokens that are then paid out to their users, this does not change with ARC-0046. In addition, if pools stake to comply with ARC-0046, this does not implicate the user. If the user stakes to comply with ARC-0046, then they will receive the reward and the pool will not receive the reward. So on a fundamental level, I'm trying to understand what the exact point is, because I'm not seeing it. |
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Sorry but then i have to repeat myself more or less, let me once summarize the core points clearly and succinctly again. ARC-0046, as currently designed, creates both legal and security risks that should not be underestimated, especially for users and operators within the EU under MiCA, but also potentially in other jurisdictions. Pools holding user tokens = custodial risk under MiCA Under MiCA, “custodial crypto-asset services” include holding or managing crypto-assets on behalf of third parties, even temporarily. Pools engaged in this kind of activity must register as CASPs (Crypto-Asset Service Providers). You wrote:
This statement overlooks a key distinction: While many pools may temporarily hold tokens to facilitate payouts —often within 24 hours— this is fundamentally different from requiring users to lock or stake tokens for extended periods under the control of a pool. Most pools distribute rewards quickly, minimizing custodial risk. Even short-term token holding can already fall into a regulatory grey area under MiCA, but in such cases, it is usually a technical necessity, not a requirement imposed by protocol design. ARC-0046, however, introduces a structural mechanism that, after July 31, 2025, effectively forces provers to commit their tokens long-term to pools. This significantly increases both custodial risks and potential regulatory exposure for users and pool operators. Token concentration creates economic centralization and systemic risk Reduced user autonomy and fewer opportunities for small provers Emergence of single points of failure or potential collusion Even if provers are technically “off-chain,” they perform the essential ZK computations that uphold the network’s privacy and correctness guarantees. If those computations are controlled by a few entities, network decentralization is compromised in practice, even if consensus remains technically unaffected. Pool failure = real user loss (this happens) This is exactly why regulations like MiCA were introduced to prevent users from being exposed to unregulated, high-risk custodianship models. MiCA exists to protect users from this exact setup Pools are not subject to oversight unless they voluntarily register, which they likely won’t No legal clarity or compliance assurances have been communicated by Aleo Labs or the ecosystem MiCA doesn’t care where the service is based. It applies if the user is located in the EU. That means EU-based users interacting with such pools could unknowingly violate financial regulations or become victims of non-compliant services. What’s needed instead: Clear legal guidance on how ARC-0046 complies with MiCA and other comparable frameworks A shift in focus from “consensus-only decentralization” to holistic decentralization, including the proving layer This isn’t about semantics, consensus mechanisms, or theoretical attack models. It’s about protecting users from legal and financial harm, something MiCA was specifically designed to do. If Aleo or its ecosystem encourages custodial structures without adequate legal safeguards, it puts users and the network at risk. This deserves serious consideration, not dismissal. I hope this message provides sufficient clarity on the regulatory and security concerns I’ve raised. I encourage you to carefully review all my previous posts as well, since much of the important context and details have already been shared there. Aleo should stand not only for security and privacy but also for safety protecting users legally, financially, and operationally. |
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Check out Nicehash... they had to deal with the EU regulations of which onyx99 speaks. Also perhaps the pools can have the provers stake ALEO in their own wallets to meet the requirement instead of the pools staking on our behalf. I believe this would solve the regulatory issue. WhalePool so far is trying to come up with a system, but number 1, they are making references to their platform that do not exist and number 2, they seem to be spit-balling ideas instead of coming up with a concrete solution/implementation. This is very frustrating for us small miners. Please help. |
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Let's continue discussion regarding Whalepool in this thread: #97 (reply in thread) |
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I would like clarity as to the rate of interest if any for the steamed
coins.
…On Tue, Jul 15, 2025, 8:16 AM ckalmighty ***@***.***> wrote:
Good Morning @howardwu <https://github.com/howardwu>, I had just found
out in the ALEO discord from "Eugene | Community Team" that voting is only
done by Validators. This means that a vote that affected miners took place
where the miners were unable to represent themselves. I don't think it's
fair that decisions are made about how miners are to operate without
miners' input or say. I can't help but to draw a parallel conclusion to the
American Revolutionary War and one of the reasons why the United States was
formed ("No Taxation without Representation" being a popular slogan at that
time).
You had said, "for which all provers could participate" but I have learned
that this isn't true at all. We, as provers have absolutely NO WAY to stop
this proposal and that just isn't right. There is obviously a lot of
disagreement with this proposal between those that proposed/voted on it and
those that it actually affects who were unable to participate in the vote.
We need to come to a resolution on this that is fair for all, including
those that were not represented in the vote.
Screenshot provided as my source:
Screenshot.2025-07-15.at.08.12.12.png (view on web)
<https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4108099d-9815-4d01-8911-d807b3720514>
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Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub
<#97 (reply in thread)>,
or unsubscribe
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.
You are receiving this because you commented.Message ID:
***@***.***>
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As a core idea, it's not bad that both the mining operator and the miners should have some kind of commitment to ALEO. Locking coins — even for the long term — isn't an issue if there’s interest in return. If you can make it so that I manage the staking myself, and I just attach a tag to it that the pool operator can use — then that would no longer be a problem. |
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Right we need details to understand. The pool people are holding coins. We
agreed to this. Not all miners just sell all of their coins. In this case I
have not sold any of them.
…On Fri, Jul 18, 2025, 2:33 PM Gabor Berenyi ***@***.***> wrote:
As a core idea, it's not bad that both the mining operator and the miners
should have some kind of commitment to ALEO.
My problem, however, is that it's my money that the pool operator is
asking for.
Even though I know it's being staked, I've completely lost control over it.
Locking coins — even for the long term — isn't an issue if there’s
interest in return.
But we all know what happens when someone else is arrange of your crypto.
“Don’t worry, I’ll take care of it for you!”
If you can make it so that I manage the staking myself, and I just attach
a tag to it that the pool operator can use — then that would no longer be a
problem.
—
Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub
<#97 (comment)>,
or unsubscribe
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You are receiving this because you commented.Message ID:
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God created man. Smith and Wesson made them equal. !
…On Thu, Jul 31, 2025, 10:45 AM hultmane ***@***.***> wrote:
To clarify regarding 153 votes and 40 unique voters, there are different
voting powers for each of the roles that are able to participate in the
voting process.
"All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others."
—
Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub
<#97 (reply in thread)>,
or unsubscribe
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arc: 0046
title: Staking for Puzzle Solution Submissions
authors: @howardwu, @raychu86
discussion: #97
topic: Protocol
status: Draft
created: 05-25-25
Abstract
This ARC proposes a mechanism requiring provers on the Aleo Network to stake a specific amount of Aleo credits to be eligible to submit a specific number of solutions per epoch. This feature is programmatic, with a stepwise increase in the required amount of stake over a two-year period following the activation of this ARC.
The goal of this ARC is to align prover incentives with the overall network’s health, and gradually adjust up economic requirements for provers as the network matures.
Motivation
This ARC ensures the network incentivizes all participants to improve the health and security of the Aleo Network. As such, this proposal addresses several key objectives:
Specification
As the Aleo Network grows, ensuring long-term security, stability, and fair participation is critical to the success of the ecosystem.
Currently, provers are able to participate in Proof of Succinct Work and earn puzzle rewards without any entry or exit requirements. This ARC contemplates introducing entry requirements for provers, and while exit requirements are desirable, they are out of scope for this ARC at this time.
To participate as a prover on the Aleo network, this ARC proposes requiring the prover to stake a minimum number of Aleo credits (X) to submit 1 solution per epoch. As such, if the prover wishes to submit 2 solutions per epoch, they must stake 2*X Aleo credits on the Aleo network. This approach ensures that pools do not gain any advantage over individual provers, ensuring fairness for all parties submitting solutions. As expected, once the prover submits their allotment of solutions per epoch, all subsequent solutions submitted by the prover will be rejected.
At this time, there is no requirement that the prover must stake to any specific validator. Rather, in consensus, the protocol will enforce that the prover submitting solutions has an adequate amount of stake that is bonded to a validator on the Aleo Network.
The staking requirement will increase in a stepwise function over 2 years on a quarterly basis. Namely, each quarter, the amount of stake required to submit 1 solution per epoch will increase for provers.
The following outlines the timetable for introducing the stepwise staking requirements for provers to continue participating on the Aleo Network:
A security goal of this ARC is to ensure that provers stake at least 33% of the total token supply by the end of the 2 year timeframe. This ensures the network maintains the interest of provers as an availability guarantee for the puzzle itself, as the network adheres to standard Byzantine fault tolerance principles.
FAQs
The following are commonly asked questions that are intended to provide clarity for this new cryptoeconomic mechanism.
When will this staking requirement for provers begin?
While this ARC will require the governance process to pass it, we hope to start this as soon as Summer 2025.
The amount of Aleo credits required to stake feels unfair and/or excessive. Why were these amounts chosen?
The candid answer is that some participants sell their earned Aleo credits after they have been rewarded, and some pools have been known to facilitate the sale of Aleo credits after they have been distributed. If the participants kept their earned rewards, they would have adequate tokens to begin participating in Proof of Succinct Work with this new proposal. As an early ecosystem, it is imperative to prioritize participants with adequate resources to support and contribute back to the network, while disincentivizing participants who wish to take advantage of a growing ecosystem. In this manner, this ARC will benefit long-term stakeholders of the Aleo Network, improving overall network health.
Who does this ARC benefit most and why?
This ARC benefits three parties: validators, provers, & long-term token holders of Aleo credits. For many validators, they should expect to receive delegations from provers as part of the rollout of this ARC over the next 2 years. For provers, they will earn additional staking yield from their token rewards via the staking process. For long-term token holders of Aleo credits, they should have increased confidence that network tokens are being used to secure the Aleo Network and delegated appropriately to the network. As the staking requirements increase over the next 2 years, long-term holders should recognize the security and health benefits of this gradual rollout for the ecosystem.
Reference Implementations
A snarkVM implementation is currently nearing final completion as of May 25, 2025. A live preview of this ARC implementation can be found here for your review: ProvableHQ/snarkVM#2734
Dependencies
The primary changes will occur in snarkVM, and impact snarkOS alongside all provers and pools currently participating on the Aleo Network.
Backwards Compatibility
This ARC introduces a new cryptoeconomic mechanism and will require a network upgrade. It is not backwards compatible with previous network state when staking for solution submissions was not required. As such, validators must upgrade in unison for this ARC to take effect.
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